IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/49912.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Contingent Profit and Loss Sharing (C-Pls) Contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Nabi, Mahmoud Sami

Abstract

This paper analyses the feasibility of profit and loss sharing (PLS) contracts in presence of moral hazard between the principal (financier) and the agent (entrepreneur). It shows that introducing a rule for sharing profits and losses in contingence with the outcome of the entrepreneur’s project enlarges the feasibility region of the PLS contracts by enabling more entrepreneurs to access external financing. More specifically, in the contingent profit and loss sharing contract (C-PLS) losses are shared according to the capital participation of each party. But, in case of success, the entrepreneur receives a higher share of the profit which is endogenously determined according to the opportunity cost of capital of the financier (risk-free rate of return) and the characteristics of the project. It is also interestingly shown that having two subsequent C-PLS contracts where the second-period expected profit of the entrepreneur is positively correlated to the first-period probability of success, has an even more incentive effect when the entrepreneur is sufficiently fore-sighted and the size of the project inferior to a determined threshold. Finally, the developed framework sets the rationale for a list of policy recommendations to enhance the use of the C-PLS contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Nabi, Mahmoud Sami, 2013. "Contingent Profit and Loss Sharing (C-Pls) Contracts," MPRA Paper 49912, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:49912
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49912/1/MPRA_paper_49912.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
    2. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1994. " Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 371-402, June.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    4. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
    5. Trester, Jeffrey J., 1998. "Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 675-699, August.
    6. Sahlman, William A., 1990. "The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 473-521, October.
    7. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    8. Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 647-663.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Profit sharing; moral hazard.;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:49912. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.