Microfinance, subsidies and local externalities
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Bester, Helmut, 1994.
"The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(1), pages 72-86, February.
- Bester, H., 1990. "The Role Of Collateral In A Model Of Debt Renegotiation," Papers 9060, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Bester, H., 1990. "The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation," Discussion Paper 1990-60, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Helmut Bester, 1990. "The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0001, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ..
- Robert Cressy, 2006. "Why do Most Firms Die Young?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 103-116, March.
- Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2000. "Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(465), pages 601-631, July.
- Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2005.
"Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint liability,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 415-439, August.
- Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2003. "Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint liability," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-10, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
- Jonathan Conning, 2000. "Monitoring by Peers or by Delegates? Joint Liability Loans under Moral Hazard," Department of Economics Working Papers 2000-07, Department of Economics, Williams College.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & N'Guessan, Tchetche, 2000. "Group lending with adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 773-784, May.
- de Aghion, Beatriz Armendariz & Gollier, Christian, 2000. "Peer Group Formation in an Adverse Selection Model," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(465), pages 632-643, July.
- Cressy, Robert, 1996. "Are Business Startups Debt-Rationed?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(438), pages 1253-1270, September.
- Kenichi Ueda, 2001. "Transitional Growth with Increasing Inequality and Financial Deepening," IMF Working Papers 01/108, International Monetary Fund.
- Chan, Yuk-Shee & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987.
" Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 42(2), pages 345-363, June.
- Yuk-Shee Chan & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information," Finance 0411019, EconWPA.
- Ghatak, Maitreesh & Guinnane, Timothy W., 1999.
"The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 195-228, October.
- Maitreesh Ghatak & Timothy W. Guinnane, 1998. "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice," Working Papers 791, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
- Ghatak, M. & Guinnane, T.W., 1998. "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice," Papers 791, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
- Maitreesh Ghatak & Timothy W. Guinnane, 1998. "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice," Discussion Papers 98-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz, 1999. "On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 79-104, October.
- Steven M. Fazzari & R. Glenn Hubbard & Bruce C. Petersen, 1988. "Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 19(1), pages 141-206.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1990. "Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 4(3), pages 351-366, September.
- David de Meza & David C. Webb, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 281-292.
- Edward Simpson Prescott, 1997. "Group lending and financial intermediation: an example," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 23-48.
- Shubhashis Gangopadhyay & Maitreesh Ghatak & Robert Lensink, 2005. "Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 1005-1015, October.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
- Aydogan Alti, 2003. "How Sensitive Is Investment to Cash Flow When Financing Is Frictionless?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(2), pages 707-722, April.
- Conning, Jonathan, 1999. "Outreach, sustainability and leverage in monitored and peer-monitored lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 51-77, October.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Cid, Alejandro & Cabrera, José María & Bernatzky, Marianne, 2017.
"Frequency of testing. Lessons from a field experiment in higher education,"
84616, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Cid, Alejandro & Cabrera, José María & Bernatzky, Marianne, 2017. "Frequency of testing. Lessons from a field experiment in higher education," MPRA Paper 84760, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ashfaq Ahmad Khan & Wiqar Ahmad, 2013. "Matching resources with demand: a flawed strategy?," Asia-Pacific Development Journal, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), vol. 20(1), pages 63-89, June.
- Alejandro Cid & José María Cabrera, 2012. "Joint-Liability vs. Individual Incentives in the Classroom. Lessons from a Field Experiment with Undergraduate Students," Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers 1206, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
- Marianne Bernatzky & José María Cabrera & Alejandro Cid, 2014. "Gender & High Frequency vs. Low Frequency tasks in a context of Joint-Liability Incentives," Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers 1405, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
- Cid, Alejandro & Bernatzky, Marianne, 2014. "Gender and high frequency vs low frequency tasks in a context of joint-liability incentives," MPRA Paper 59960, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
KeywordsMicrofinance; Group lending; Subsidies; G21; L26; O16;
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
- O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:34:y:2010:i:3:p:309-321. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.