IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Does Subsidising the Cost of Capital Help the Poorest? An Analysis of Saving Opportunities in Group Lending

This paper shows that subsidising the cost of capital restricts the ability of the poorest to participate in the group lending mechanisms that include saving opportunities. We document the group lending mechanism used by a typical microfinance lender in Haryana, India. Individuals can participate in the group either as a borrower or a saver. The lender requires that the borrower partly self-finance their project with their own cash wealth. Consequently, a borrower requires a minimum amount of cash wealth to borrow. The poorest participate in the group by co-financing the borrower's project with their meagre savings. In return, they obtain higher than market returns on their savings. Subsidising the cost of capital reduces the cash wealth required to participate in the group as a borrower. Conversely, it increases the cash wealth required to participate as a saver, thus curtailing the opportunity for the poorest to enrich themselves.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.aniket.co.uk/research/savings.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in its series ESE Discussion Papers with number 140.

as
in new window

Length: 40
Date of creation: Feb 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:140
Contact details of provider: Postal: 31 Buccleuch Place, EH8 9JT, Edinburgh
Phone: +44(0)1316508361
Fax: +44(0)1316504514
Web page: http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Banerjee, Abhijit V & Besley, Timothy & Guinnane, Timothy W, 1994. "Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 491-515, May.
  2. Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1991. "Group Lending, Repayment Incentives And Social Collateral," Papers 152, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
  3. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Guinnane, Timothy W., 1999. "The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 195-228, October.
  4. Kumar Aniket, 2005. "Sequential Group Lending with Moral Hazard," ESE Discussion Papers 136, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  5. Holmström, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector," IDEI Working Papers 40, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  6. Jonathan Conning, 2000. "Monitoring by Peers or by Delegates? Joint Liability Loans under Moral Hazard," Department of Economics Working Papers 2000-07, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  7. Ghatak, Maitreesh, 1999. "Group lending, local information and peer selection," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 27-50, October.
  8. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2003. "Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint liability," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-10, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
  9. Jonathan Morduch, 1999. "The Microfinance Promise," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1569-1614, December.
  10. Conning, Jonathan, 1999. "Outreach, sustainability and leverage in monitored and peer-monitored lending," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 51-77, October.
  11. Van Tassel, Eric, 1999. "Group lending under asymmetric information," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 3-25, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:140. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gina Reddie)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.