IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/gam/jsusta/v17y2025i6p2475-d1610224.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Can We Have Both? The Challenges of Efficiency Outcomes in a Public Procurement System and Reaching the Strategic Goals of Procurement

Author

Listed:
  • Sašo Matas

    (Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Maribor, Razlagova 14, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
    Ministry of Public Administration, Tržaška cesta 21, 10000 Ljubljana, Slovenia)

  • Žan Jan Oplotnik

    (Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Maribor, Razlagova 14, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia)

  • Timotej Jagrič

    (Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Maribor, Razlagova 14, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia)

Abstract

This article explores the cost efficiency of public procurement procedures, techniques and strategic policies. Member States in the EU spend large sums of money on the procurement of various items, yet public procurement in the EU struggles with issues of competitiveness, efficiency and overlapping goals. The competitiveness and efficiency of various factors, procedures, techniques and sustainable measures employed in public procurement procedures that influence cost efficiency were examined in this study using data from Slovenian public procurement over the past eight years. The analysis employed a binary logit model that facilitates the efficient utilization of public funds and predicts substantial price reductions in public procurement procedures. The findings underscore the significance of transparency and open markets. The optimal cost-efficiency outcomes are achieved through combinations of transparent procedures and an undisclosed market environment during the tendering phase, complemented by less binding secondary procurement objectives. Conversely, procurement techniques that tend to disclose more information about competitors in the procurement process are found to be less cost-effective. Non-mandatory sustainable policies in public procurement tend to lead to better results in terms of cost efficiency than those imposed by an obligatory legal framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Sašo Matas & Žan Jan Oplotnik & Timotej Jagrič, 2025. "Can We Have Both? The Challenges of Efficiency Outcomes in a Public Procurement System and Reaching the Strategic Goals of Procurement," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 17(6), pages 1-20, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:17:y:2025:i:6:p:2475-:d:1610224
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/17/6/2475/pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/17/6/2475/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bajari, Patrick & Tadelis, Steven, 2001. "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 387-407, Autumn.
    2. Peter Nemec & Veronika Ďuricová & Matus Kubak, 2023. "Institutions, corruption and transparency in effective healthcare public procurement: Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(6), pages 619-646, August.
    3. Francesco Decarolis, 2009. "When the highest bidder loses the auction: theory and evidence from public procurement," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 717, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    4. Clifford P. McCue & Eric Prier & David Swanson, 2015. "Five dilemmas in public procurement," Journal of Public Procurement, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 15(2), pages 177-207, March.
    5. Bryngemark, Elina & Söderholm, Patrik & Thörn, Martina, 2023. "The adoption of green public procurement practices: Analytical challenges and empirical illustration on Swedish municipalities," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(PA).
    6. Krieger, Bastian & Zipperer, Vera, 2022. "Does green public procurement trigger environmental innovations?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(6).
    7. Juraj Nemec & Matus Grega & Marta Orviska, 2020. "Over-bureaucratisation in public procurement: purposes and results," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 44(2), pages 251-263.
    8. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1, December.
    9. Nicolas, Ruben & Titl, Vítězslav & Schotanus, Fredo, 2025. "European funds and green public procurement," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
    10. Lalive, Rafael & Schmutzler, Armin, 2011. "Auctions vs Negotiations in Public Procurement: Which Works Better?," CEPR Discussion Papers 8538, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Lukas VOGEL, 2009. "Macroeconomic effects of cost savings in public procurement," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 389, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    12. Eshien Chong & Carine Staropoli & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2014. "Auction versus Negotiation in Public Procurement: Looking for Empirical Evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00512813, HAL.
    13. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Survey of Auction Theory, from Auctions: Theory and Practice," Introductory Chapters, in: Auctions: Theory and Practice, Princeton University Press.
    14. Christopher McCrudden, 2004. "Using public procurement to achieve social outcomes," Natural Resources Forum, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(4), pages 257-267, November.
    15. Chunling Yu & Toru Morotomi & Haiping Yu, 2020. "What Influences Adoption of Green Award Criteria in a Public Contract? An Empirical Analysis of 2018 European Public Procurement Contract Award Notices," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-20, February.
    16. Albano,Gian Luigi & Nicholas,Caroline, 2016. "The Law and Economics of Framework Agreements," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107077966, November.
    17. Caroline Flammer, 2018. "Competing for government procurement contracts: The role of corporate social responsibility," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 1299-1324, May.
    18. Sofia Lundberg & Per-Olov Marklund, 2018. "Green public procurement and multiple environmental objectives," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 45(1), pages 37-53, March.
    19. Giulia Buccino & Elisabetta Iossa & Biancamaria Raganelli & Mate Vincze, 2020. "Competitive dialogue: an economic and legal assessment," Journal of Public Procurement, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 20(2), pages 163-185, March.
    20. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721, November.
    21. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Baldi, Simona & Bottasso, Anna & Conti, Maurizio & Piccardo, Chiara, 2016. "To bid or not to bid: That is the question: Public procurement, project complexity and corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 89-106.
    2. Paulo Fagandini & Ingemar Dierickx, 2023. "Computing Profit-Maximizing Bid Shading Factors in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 1009-1035, March.
    3. A. Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2015. "An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 769-784, August.
    4. Jonathan Levin & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2016. "Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(9), pages 2528-2551, September.
    5. Brânzei, R. & Fragnelli, V. & Meca, A. & Tijs, S.H., 2006. "Two Classes of Cooperative Games Related to One-Object Auction Situations," Discussion Paper 2006-25, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. Ganuza, Juan José & Viecens, María Fernanda, 2011. "Deployment of high-speed broadband infrastructures during the economic crisis. The case of Xarxa Oberta," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(9), pages 857-870.
    7. Zhen Li & Ching-Chung Kuo, 2013. "Design of discrete Dutch auctions with an uncertain number of bidders," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 211(1), pages 255-272, December.
    8. Estrella Alonso & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano & Juan Tejada, 2020. "Mixed Mechanisms for Auctioning Ranked Items," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(12), pages 1-26, December.
    9. Nicola Dimitri, 2021. "The “Italian Football Federation Auction” for Co-ownership Resolution," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(2), pages 275-285, March.
    10. Li, Zhen & Kuo, Ching-Chung, 2011. "Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(3), pages 721-729, December.
    11. Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2014. "An Efficient and Incentive Compatible Dynamic Auction for Multiple Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(2), pages 422-466.
    12. Fabian Muniesa & Michel Callon, 2008. "La performativité des sciences économiques," CSI Working Papers Series 010, Centre de Sociologie de l'Innovation (CSI), Mines ParisTech.
    13. Whitten, Stuart M. & Reeson, Andrew & Windle, Jill & Rolfe, John, 2013. "Designing conservation tenders to support landholder participation: A framework and case study assessment," Ecosystem Services, Elsevier, vol. 6(C), pages 82-92.
    14. Isa Hafalir & Onur Kesten & Katerina Sherstyuk & Cong Tao, 2023. "When Speed is of Essence: Perishable Goods Auctions," Working Papers 202310, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    15. Kashyap, Ravi, 2018. "Auction theory adaptations for real life applications," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(4), pages 452-481.
    16. Marco Pagnozzi & Krista J. Saral, 2015. "Demand Reduction in Multi-Object Auctions with Resale: An Experimental Analysis," CSEF Working Papers 416, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    17. Alessandra Casella & Adam B. Cox, 2018. "A Property Rights Approach to Temporary Work Visas," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(S1), pages 195-227.
    18. Justus Haucap, 2020. "Nobelpreis für Robert Wilson und Paul Milgrom: Zwei Ökonomen, die echte Märkte schufen [Nobel Prize for Robert Wilson and Paul Milgrom: Two Economists who Created Real Markets]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 100(12), pages 969-975, December.
    19. Zhou, Yu & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2023. "Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 210-228.
    20. Sweeting, Andrew & Bhattacharya, Vivek, 2015. "Selective entry and auction design," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 189-207.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:17:y:2025:i:6:p:2475-:d:1610224. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: MDPI Indexing Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mdpi.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.