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The allocation of CO2 emissions as a claims problem

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  • Duro, Juan Antonio
  • Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel
  • Vilella, Cori

Abstract

In the context of multilateral negotiations on climate change, this paper proposes to use the claims approach as a reasonable and practicable alternative in order to allocate the admissible CO2 emissions per region. The proposed methodology entails analyze the application of a broad group of theoretical solutions through the establishment of equity and stability criteria. To this regard, the empirical analyzing combines several CO2 world endowments from Meinshausen et al. (2009) together with claims forecasts associated with the RCP (Representative Concentration Pathways) scenarios. The results obtained indicate that the constrained equal awards and α-minimal solutions are clearly equity-sensitive. Given that the CO2 emission reduction imposed by the constrained equal awards solution on Asia and the OECD are very important, and considering the better balance between equity and proportionality associated with the α-min solution, it could be that this latter solution would be the most practicable and acceptable.

Suggested Citation

  • Duro, Juan Antonio & Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel & Vilella, Cori, 2020. "The allocation of CO2 emissions as a claims problem," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:86:y:2020:i:c:s0140988319304499
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2019.104652
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Carbon emissions; Claims problem; Climate change policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H8 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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