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Restoring a Fish Stock: A Dynamic Bankruptcy Problem

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  • Elena Inarra
  • Anders Skonhoft

Abstract

Total Allowable Catch (TAC)-regulating schemes have been introduced in most fisheries. TAC distribution following the Proportional Rule, based on historical catches, implies that harvesters or vessel groups that have captured more in the past and contributed to overfishing are getting larger quotas than groups that have contributed less to overfishing. In contrast to this rule, a more egalitarian rule, the Constrained Equal Award Rule, is proposed for distributing the TAC. Contingent upon the fishing techniques used by the harvesters, it is demonstrated how the fish-stock recovery period, harvest, and profitability may vary according to these two rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Elena Inarra & Anders Skonhoft, 2008. "Restoring a Fish Stock: A Dynamic Bankruptcy Problem," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 84(2), pages 327-339.
  • Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:84:y:2008:i:2:p:327-339
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marta Escapa & RaÚl Prellezo, 2003. "Fishing Technology and Optimal Distribution of Harvest Rates," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 25(3), pages 377-394, July.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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