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Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium

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Cited by:

  1. Flavio Bazzana & Luigi Mittone & Luciano Andreozzi, 2015. "The Freeze-out Bond Exchange Offer: An Experimental Approach," Journal of Behavioral Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(2), pages 150-162, April.
  2. William H. Sandholm, 1998. "History-Independent Prediction In Evolutionary Game Theory," Rationality and Society, , vol. 10(3), pages 303-326, August.
  3. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ana Mauleon & Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, 2004. "Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(4), pages 519-531, August.
  4. Jacquemet Nicolas & Zylbersztejn Adam, 2013. "Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-33, July.
  5. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  6. Bhaskar, V., 1994. "Noisy communication and the fast evolution of cooperation," Discussion Paper 1994-112, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2018. "Coordination with communication under oath," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 627-649, September.
  8. McGinn, Kathleen L. & Milkman, Katherine L. & Nöth, Markus, 2012. "Walking the talk in multiparty bargaining: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 278-291.
  9. Francisca Jiménez-Jiménez & Javier Rodero Cosano, 2021. "Experimental cheap talk games: strategic complementarity and coordination," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 235-263, September.
  10. Charness, Gary, 2000. "Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 177-194, November.
  11. Andreas Blume & Peter H. Kriss & Roberto A. Weber, 2017. "Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(2), pages 368-395, June.
  12. Rabin, Matthew, 1990. "Communication between rational agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 144-170, June.
  13. Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert & Wengström, Erik, 2018. "How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 153-181.
  14. Ambrus, Attila, 2006. "Coalitional Rationalizability," Scholarly Articles 3200266, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  15. Battiston, Pietro & Harrison, Sharon G., 2024. "Believe it or not: Experimental evidence on sunspot equilibria with social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 223-247.
  16. Alesina, Alberto & Spolaore, Enrico, 2005. "War, peace, and the size of countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1333-1354, July.
  17. Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
  18. Olivier Gossner & Nicolas Melissas, 2006. "Informational Cascades Elicit Private Information ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 297-325, February.
  19. Kuang, Xi (Jason) & Weber, Roberto A. & Dana, Jason, 2007. "How effective is advice from interested parties?: An experimental test using a pure coordination game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 591-604, April.
  20. Paola Manzini & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2009. "On Smiles, Winks and Handshakes as Coordination Devices," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 826-854, April.
  21. Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2009. "Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1850-1877, December.
  22. Demichelis, Stefano & Weibull, Jörgen, 2006. "Efficiency, communication and honesty," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 645, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 28 Nov 2006.
  23. Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI, 2016. "Implementing Tax Coordination and Harmonization through Voluntary Commitment," Working Papers P181, FERDI.
  24. Urbano, A. & Vila, J. E., 2004. "Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 143-173, January.
  25. David A. Miller & Joel Watson, 2013. "A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2303-2350, November.
  26. Anderlini, Luca & Sabourian, Hamid, 2001. "Cooperation and computability in n-player games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 99-137, September.
  27. Topi Miettinen, 2008. "Contracts and Promises - An Approach to Pre-play Agreements," Jena Economics Research Papers 2008-088, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  28. Warziniack, Travis & Shogren, Jason F. & Parkhurst, Gregory, 2007. "Creating contiguous forest habitat: An experimental examination on incentives and communication," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 191-207, August.
  29. Kenneth Clark & Stephen Kay & Martin Sefton, 2001. "When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(4), pages 495-515.
  30. Dietmar Fehr, 2011. "The Persistence of "Bad" Precedents and the Need for Communication: A Coordination Experiment," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2011-039, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  31. Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August.
  32. Houba, H., 1992. "Non-cooperative bargaining in infinitely repeated games with binding contracts," Serie Research Memoranda 0009, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
  33. Baliga, Sandeep & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 450-468, August.
  34. Karl WÄrneryd, 1998. "Communication, complexity, and evolutionary stability," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(4), pages 599-609.
  35. Sobel, Joel, 2017. "A note on pre-play communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 477-486.
  36. Nicolai J. Foss, 1999. "Understanding Leadership A Coordination Theory," DRUID Working Papers 99-3, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
  37. Blume, Andreas, 1998. "Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 171-202, February.
  38. Anderlini, Luca, 1999. "Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-37, April.
  39. Claude Meidinger, 2018. "Cooperation and evolution of meaning in senders-receivers games," Post-Print halshs-01960762, HAL.
  40. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie, 1992. "Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 36-51.
  41. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
  42. Claude Meidinger, 2018. "Cooperation and evolution of meaning in senders-receivers games," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 18036, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  43. Dugar, Subhasish & Shahriar, Quazi, 2018. "Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 294-310.
  44. Bhaskar, V., 1994. "Noisy communication and the fast evolution of cooperation," Other publications TiSEM 3b3c313c-c748-4037-92a1-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  45. Sobel, Joel, 2017. "A note on pre-play communication," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt68d1t1xg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  46. Ganna Pogrebna & David Krantz & Christian Schade & Claudia Keser, 2011. "Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 473-502, October.
  47. Ambrus, Attila, 2009. "Theories of coalitional rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 676-695, March.
  48. Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert, 2006. "Organizational Structure as the Channeling of Boundedly Rational Pre-play Communication," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 634, Stockholm School of Economics.
  49. Ro’i Zultan, 2013. "Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 789-800, November.
  50. Cieslik, Katarzyna & Cecchi, Francesco & Assefa Damtew, Elias & Tafesse, Shiferaw & Struik, Paul C. & Lemaga, Berga & Leeuwis, Cees, 2021. "The role of ICT in collective management of public bads: The case of potato late blight in Ethiopia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
  51. Arvan, Lanny & Cabral, Luis & Santos, Vasco, 1999. "Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 97-106, January.
  52. Colman, Andrew M. & Stirk, Jonathan A., 1998. "Stackelberg reasoning in mixed-motive games: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 279-293, April.
  53. Miettinen, Topi, 2013. "Promises and conventions – An approach to pre-play agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 68-84.
  54. He, Simin & Offerman, Theo & van de Ven, Jeroen, 2019. "The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 238-273.
  55. Heller, Yuval & Sturrock, David, 2020. "Promises and endogenous reneging costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
  56. Jin, Ye & Zhou, Zhen & Brandenburger, Adam, 2023. "Coordination via delay: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 23-49.
  57. Tigran Melkonyan & Surajeet Chakravarty, 2024. "Pre‐play promises, threats and commitments under partial credibility," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(1), pages 308-328, January.
  58. Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu, 2009. "Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-255, May.
  59. Gilles Grandjean & Marco Mantovani & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2014. "Whom are you talking with? An experiment on credibility and communication structure," Working Papers 285, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2014.
  60. Bhaskar, V. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2004. "Migration and the evolution of conventions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 397-418, November.
  61. Grandjean, Gilles & Mantovani, Marco & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2017. "Communication structure and coalition-proofness – Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 90-102.
  62. Noe, Thomas H, 1998. "Rationalizable and Coalition Proof Shareholder Tendering Strategies in Corporate Takeovers," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 269-291, November.
  63. Fehr, Dietmar, 2017. "Costly communication and learning from failure in organizational coordination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 106-122.
  64. Melody Lo, 2021. "Language and coordination games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 49-92, July.
  65. Crawford, Vincent, 1998. "A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 286-298, February.
  66. Claude Meidinger, 2018. "Cooperation and evolution of meaning in senders-receivers games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01960762, HAL.
  67. Nicolai J. Foss, 1998. "Austrian Economics and Game Theory a Preliminary Methodological Stocktaking," DRUID Working Papers 98-28, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
  68. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1998. "Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 108-122, May.
  69. Crawford, Vincent P., 2017. "Let׳s talk it over: Coordination via preplay communication with level-k thinking," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 20-31.
  70. Heller, Yuval & Sturrock, David, 2017. "Promises and Endogenous Reneging Costs," MPRA Paper 78803, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  71. Grant, Simon & Quiggin, John, 1998. "The meeting place problem: Salience and search," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 271-283, January.
  72. Wang, Siyu & Houser, Daniel, 2019. "Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 381-395.
  73. Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 0511, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
  74. Ambrus, Attila, 2009. "Theories of Coalitional Rationality," Scholarly Articles 3204917, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  75. Edoardo Grillo, 2013. "Reference Dependence, Risky Projects and Credible Information Transmission," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 331, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
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