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Economically Optimal Performance Evaluation And Control-Systems

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Daniel Johanson, 2008. "Corporate governance and board accounts: exploring a neglected interface between boards of directors and management," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 12(4), pages 343-380, November.
  2. M. Boyer, 2003. "Contracting under ex post moral hazard and non-commitment," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(1), pages 1-38, August.
  3. Bracha Meth, 1996. "Reduction of Outcome Variance: Optimality and Incentives," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 309-328, March.
  4. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi & Adriano A. Rampini, 2008. "Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(1), pages 158-209, March.
  5. Villadsen, Bente, 1995. "Communication and delegation in collusive agencies," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 315-344, April.
  6. Gigler, Frank & Hemmer, Thomas, 2002. "Informational costs and benefits of creating separately identifiable operating segments," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 69-90, February.
  7. Li, Anqi & Yang, Ming, 2020. "Optimal incentive contract with endogenous monitoring technology," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
  8. J C Fellingham & Y K Kwon & D P Newman, 2010. "Ex Ante Randomization in Agency Models," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1953, David K. Levine.
  9. Gao, Pingyang, 2013. "A measurement approach to conservatism and earnings management," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 251-268.
  10. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2007. "Ranking Contingent Monitoring Systems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(9), pages 1501-1509, September.
  11. Potters, Jan & Rockenbach, Bettina & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & van Damme, Eric, 2004. "Collusion under yardstick competition: an experimental study," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 1017-1038, September.
  12. Peter-J. Jost, 2023. "Auditing versus monitoring and the role of commitment," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 463-496, June.
  13. Baiman, Stanley & Rajan, Madhav V., 2002. "Incentive issues in inter-firm relationships," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 213-238, April.
  14. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1996. "Tax evasion and the optimum general income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-249, May.
  15. Finken, Jan, 2009. "Yardstick competition in German municipalities," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 09-3, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.
  16. Ramji Balakrishnan, 1990. "The role of budgets and variances in repeated investment decisions," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(1), pages 105-122, September.
  17. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 43(3), pages 30, April.
  18. Giridhara Gowda K & Sureshramana Mayya, 2016. "Problems and Prospects of Rubber Plantation Industries in Dakshina Kannada District: A Case Study with Reference Harvesting Cost," Indian Journal of Commerce and Management Studies, Educational Research Multimedia & Publications,India, vol. 7(2), pages 31-35, May.
  19. Marie-Cécile Fagart & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2002. "Auditing Policies and Information Systems in Principal-Agent Analysis," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-18, CIRANO.
  20. van Veen-Dirks, Paula, 2010. "Different uses of performance measures: The evaluation versus reward of production managers," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 141-164, February.
  21. Bengt Holmström, 2017. "Pay for Performance and Beyond," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(7), pages 1753-1777, July.
  22. Mukherji, Arijit & Nagarajan, Nandu J., 1995. "Moral hazard and contractibility in investment decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 413-430, May.
  23. Amihai Glazer & Refael Hassin, 1998. "Governmental failures in evaluating programs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 105-115, January.
  24. M. Martin Boyer, 2004. "On the Use of Hierarchies to Complete Contracts when Players Have Limited Abilities," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-41, CIRANO.
  25. Feltham, Gerald & Indjejikian, Raffi & Nanda, Dhananjay, 2006. "Dynamic incentives and dual-purpose accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 417-437, December.
  26. H. Landis Gabel & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 1994. "Environmental Audits and Incentive Compensation," CIRANO Working Papers 94s-19, CIRANO.
  27. Himick, Darlene, 2011. "Relative performance evaluation and pension investment management: A challenge for ESG investing," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 158-171.
  28. Strausz, Roland, 2006. "Buried in paperwork: Excessive reporting in organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 460-470, August.
  29. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1997. "La réglementation hospitalière : tarification par pathologie ou achat de soins ?," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 129(3), pages 207-220.
  30. Gao, Zhan & Hwang, Yuhchang & Wu, Wan-Ting, 2017. "Contractual features of CEO performance-vested equity compensation," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 282-303.
  31. Daniel F. Spulber, 1992. "Economic Analysis And Management Strategy: A Survey," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(3), pages 535-574, September.
  32. Kishore Gawande & Alok K. Bohara, 2005. "Agency Problems in Law Enforcement: Theory and Application to the U.S. Coast Guard," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(11), pages 1593-1609, November.
  33. Xin Qu & Majella Percy & Fang Hu & Jenny Stewart, 2022. "Can CEO equity‐based compensation limit investment‐related agency problems?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(2), pages 2579-2614, June.
  34. Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2007. "Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 271-299, November.
  35. Françoise Giraud, 2002. "Responsabilité et contrôlabilité:une approche empirique," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 5(1), pages 77-99, March.
  36. Amihai Glazer & Refael Hassin, 2001. "The Calculus of Stonewalling," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 13(4), pages 413-424, October.
  37. George Georgiadis & Balazs Szentes, 2020. "Optimal Monitoring Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 2075-2107, September.
  38. Aude Deville & Gary D. Ferrier & Hervé Leleu, 2009. "Performance measures for hierarchical organizations: Frontier analysis as a decision support tool," Working Papers 2009-ECO-01, IESEG School of Management.
  39. Chaney, Paul K. & Thakor, Anjan V., 1985. "Incentive effects of benevolent intervention : The case of government loan guarantees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 169-189, March.
  40. Gary S. Monroe & NG Juliana & Andrew J. Wellington, 1992. "Limiting Auditors‘ Liability: The Potential Consequences," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 1(4), pages 16-26, November.
  41. Françoise Giraud, 2001. "Responsabilite Et Controlabilite : Une Approche Empirique," Post-Print halshs-00584630, HAL.
  42. Iny Hwang & Suresh Radhakrishnan & Lixin (Nancy) Su, 2006. "Vendor Certification and Appraisal: Implications for Supplier Quality," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(10), pages 1472-1482, October.
  43. Rasmusen, E., 1994. "A Model of Negotiation, not Bargainig," Papers 94-007, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
  44. Rajiv D. Banker & Srikant M. Datar, 1992. "Optimal transfer pricing under postcontract information," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(2), pages 329-352, March.
  45. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 583-606, June.
  46. Ge Bai & Ranjani Krishnan, 2016. "Effects of Ambiguous Common Uncertainty on Employee Preference for Relative Performance Contracts," The Japanese Accounting Review, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, vol. 6, pages 65-93, December.
  47. Kishore Gawande & Timothy Wheeler, 1999. "Measures of Effectiveness for Governmental Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(1), pages 42-58, January.
  48. Tangeras, Thomas P., 2002. "Collusion-proof yardstick competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 231-254, February.
  49. Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2004. "The Organization of Delegated Expertise," IDEI Working Papers 284, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  50. Sinclair-Desgagne, Bernard & Gabel, H. Landis, 1997. "Environmental Auditing in Management Systems and Public Policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 331-346, July.
  51. Wrede, Matthias, 2001. "Yardstick competition to tame the Leviathan," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 705-721, November.
  52. Grafton, Jennifer & Lillis, Anne M. & Widener, Sally K., 2010. "The role of performance measurement and evaluation in building organizational capabilities and performance," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 35(7), pages 689-706, October.
  53. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1991. "Optimal Contracts for Teams," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 561-577, August.
  54. M. Gietzmann & A. J. Ostaszewski & M. H. G. Schroder, 2020. "Guiding the guiders: Foundations of a market-driven theory of disclosure," Papers 2002.04886, arXiv.org.
  55. de la Fuente, Angel & Marin, JoseMaria, 1996. "Innovation, bank monitoring, and endogenous financial development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 269-301, October.
  56. Joel Sobel, 1999. "A Reexamination of Yardstick Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 33-60, March.
  57. Cowen, Tyler & Glazer, Amihai, 1996. "More monitoring can induce less effort," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 113-123, July.
  58. Na, Ke, 2020. "CEOs’ outside opportunities and relative performance evaluation: evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(3), pages 679-700.
  59. Andrei Barbos, 2022. "Optimal contracts with random monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(1), pages 119-154, March.
  60. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2001. "Incentives in Common Agency," Cahiers de recherche 01-08, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  61. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
  62. Plane, Patrick, 1999. "Privatization, Technical Efficiency and Welfare Consequences: The Case of the Cote d'Ivoire Electricity Company (CIE)," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 343-360, February.
  63. Pierre Jinghong Liang & Lin Nan, 2014. "Endogenous Precision of Performance Measures and Limited Managerial Attention," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 693-727, December.
  64. Fiaz Ahmad Sulehri & Saba Sharif, 2022. "The Impact of Firm Sustainability on Firm Growth: Evidence from USA," Journal of Policy Research (JPR), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 8(2), pages 1-15, August.
  65. Thomas P. Tangerås, 2009. "Yardstick Competition and Quality," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 589-613, June.
  66. Sprinkle, Geoffrey B., 2003. "Perspectives on experimental research in managerial accounting," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 28(2-3), pages 287-318.
  67. Stanley Baiman & Jerrold H. May & Arijit Mukherji, 1990. "Optimal employment contracts and the returns to monitoring in a principal†agent context," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(2), pages 761-799, March.
  68. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1989. "Limited commitment and costly enforcement," Working Paper 90-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  69. Andersson, Fredrik & Skogh, Goran, 2003. "Quality, self-regulation, and competition: the case of insurance," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 267-280, April.
  70. Rick Antle & Joel S. Demski, 1989. "Revenue recognition," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(2), pages 423-451, March.
  71. Mark Penno, 1990. "Discussion of “Intrafirm resource allocation: The economics of transfer pricing and cost allocation in accountingâ€," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(1), pages 100-104, September.
  72. Georgiadis, George & Szentes, Balázs, 2020. "Optimal monitoring design," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 104062, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  73. Narayanan, V. G. & Davila, Antonio, 1998. "Using delegation and control systems to mitigate the trade-off between the performance-evaluation and belief-revision uses of accounting signals," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 255-282, June.
  74. Pfeffer, Jeffrey & DeVoe, Sanford E., 2012. "The Economic Evaluation of Time Organizational Causes and Individual Consequences," Research Papers 2123, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  75. Church, Bryan K. & Kuang, Xi (Jason) & Liu, Yuebing (Sarah), 2019. "The effects of measurement basis and slack benefits on honesty in budget reporting," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 74-84.
  76. Bloomfield, Matthew J., 2021. "Compensation disclosures and strategic commitment: Evidence from revenue-based pay," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(2), pages 620-643.
  77. Sánchez, José M. & Vélez, María L. & Ramón-Jerónimo, María A., 2012. "Do suppliers' formal controls damage distributors' trust?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 65(7), pages 896-906.
  78. Christian Daumoser & Bernhard Hirsch & Matthias Sohn, 2018. "Honesty in budgeting: a review of morality and control aspects in the budgetary slack literature," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 115-159, August.
  79. Anqi Li & Ming Yang, 2018. "Optimal Incentive Contract with Endogenous Monitoring Technology," Papers 1810.11471, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2019.
  80. Anil Arya & Jonathan Glover & K. Sivaramakrishnan., "undated". "The Interaction between Decision and Control Problems and the Value of Information," Corporate Finance & Organizations _016, Ohio State University.
  81. Arun Malik, 2007. "Optimal environmental regulation based on more than just emissions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 1-16, August.
  82. Peter Cheng, 1990. "Discussion of “Optimal employment contracts and the returns to monitoring in a principal†agent context†," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(2), pages 804-808, March.
  83. Au, Pak Hung & Chen, Bin R., 2019. "Objective and subjective indicators in long-term contracting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 309-331.
  84. Natarajan, Ramachandran & Sethuraman, Kannan & Surysekar, Krishnamurthy, 2005. "Reducing incremental costs associated with the delegation of incentive contracting decisions: An analysis of planning and control decisions in a manufacturing setting in the presence of moral hazard," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 162(3), pages 816-838, May.
  85. Dobbs, Ian M. & Miller, Anthony D., 2009. "Experimental evidence on financial incentives, information and decision-making," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 71-89.
  86. Liu, Cai & Yin, Chao, 2023. "Institutional investors’ monitoring attention, CEO compensation, and relative performance evaluation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
  87. Evgeny Petrov, 2020. "Voluntary Disclosure and Informed Trading," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(4), pages 2257-2286, December.
  88. Anil Arya & John Fellingham & Hans Frimor & Brian Mittendorf, 2006. "On the Role of Receivables in Managing Salesforce Incentives," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 311-324.
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