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Incentive issues in inter-firm relationships

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  • Baiman, Stanley
  • Rajan, Madhav V.

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  • Baiman, Stanley & Rajan, Madhav V., 2002. "Incentive issues in inter-firm relationships," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 213-238, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:27:y:2002:i:3:p:213-238
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ariela Caglio & Angelo Ditillo, 2012. "Interdependence and accounting information exchanges in inter-firm relationships," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(1), pages 57-80, February.
    2. Romano, Pietro & Formentini, Marco, 2012. "Designing and implementing open book accounting in buyer–supplier dyads: A framework for supplier selection and motivation," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 68-83.
    3. Caglio, Ariela & Ditillo, Angelo, 2008. "A review and discussion of management control in inter-firm relationships: Achievements and future directions," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 33(7-8), pages 865-898.
    4. Suresh Radhakrishnan & Bin Srinidhi, 2005. "Sharing Demand Information in a Value Chain: Implications for Pricing and Profitability," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 23-45, January.
    5. Van den Abbeele, Alexandra & Roodhooft, Filip & Warlop, Luk, 2009. "The effect of cost information on buyer-supplier negotiations in different power settings," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 245-266, February.
    6. Demi Chung & David A. Hensher, 2015. "Modelling Risk Perceptions of Stakeholders in Public–Private Partnership Toll Road Contracts," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 51(3), pages 437-483, September.
    7. Shannon W. Anderson & Henri C. Dekker, 2005. "Management Control for Market Transactions: The Relation Between Transaction Characteristics, Incomplete Contract Design, and Subsequent Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(12), pages 1734-1752, December.
    8. Spence, Laura J. & Rinaldi, Leonardo, 2014. "Governmentality in accounting and accountability: A case study of embedding sustainability in a supply chain," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 433-452.
    9. Madhav V. Rajan & Stefan Reichelstein, 2004. "ANNIVERSARY ARTICLE: A Perspective on ÜAsymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource AllocationÝ," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(12), pages 1615-1623, December.
    10. Mahama, Habib & Chua, Wai Fong, 2016. "A study of alliance dynamics, accounting and trust-as-practice," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 29-46.
    11. Oll, Grete, 2014. "Opportunistic Disclosure in the Inter-Organizational Relationships," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 21/2014, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Business and Economics.
    12. repec:eee:ejores:v:263:y:2017:i:3:p:961-973 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Susanna Gallani & Ranjani Krishnan & Eric J. Marinich & Michael D. Shields, 2015. "Budgeting, Psychological Contracts, and Budgetary Misreporting," Harvard Business School Working Papers 16-017, Harvard Business School, revised Jan 2018.
    14. Wouters, Marc & Anderson, James C. & Wynstra, Finn, 2005. "The adoption of total cost of ownership for sourcing decisions--a structural equations analysis," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-191, February.
    15. Speklé, R.F. & van den Bogaard, M.A., 2002. "Reinventing The Hierarchy, The Case Of The Shell Chemicals Carve-Out," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2002-52-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    16. Julius Wambua & Elegwa Mukulu & Esther Waiganjo, 2017. "Cost as a Factor of Outsourcing Third-Party Logistics Providers and the Performance of Food and Beverages Manufacturing Companies in Kenya," International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, vol. 7(2), pages 343-356, February.
    17. Paul Wanjora Kariuki & Esther Wangethi Waiganjo, 2014. "Factors Affecting Adoption of Reverse Logistics in the Kenya Manufacturing Sector: A Case Study of Coastal Bottlers Company," International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, vol. 4(9), pages 84-97, September.

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