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Collusion under yardstick competition : An experimental study

Author

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  • Potters, J.J.M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Rockenbach, B.
  • Sadrieh, A.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • van Damme, E.E.C.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

The effectiveness of relative performance evaluation schemes, such as yardstick competition, can be undermined by collusion.The degree to which the regulated agents manage to collude will be affected by the particulars of the scheme.We hypothesize that in a repeated game setting schemes will be more prone to collusion the smaller are the rents to the agents in case they behave non-cooperatively.We illustrate the relevance of this hypothesis by means of an economic experiment in which we compare the efficiency of two performance evaluation schemes.
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Suggested Citation

  • Potters, J.J.M. & Rockenbach, B. & Sadrieh, A. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2004. "Collusion under yardstick competition : An experimental study," Other publications TiSEM 2f5fc044-063c-477d-bf98-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:2f5fc044-063c-477d-bf98-dd7430487183
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sigrid Suetens & Jan Potters, 2007. "Bertrand colludes more than Cournot," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(1), pages 71-77, March.
    2. Ale-Chilet, Jorge & Chen, Cuicui & Li, Jing & Reynaert, Mathias, 2021. "Colluding Against Environmental Regulation," TSE Working Papers 21-1204, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    3. Gomez-Martinez, Francisco, 2016. "Partial Cartels and Mergers with Heterogeneous Firms: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 81132, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Jul 2017.
    4. Daniel Cracau & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2014. "The Divergent Effects of Long-Term and Short-Term Entry Investments on Home Market Cartels," FEMM Working Papers 140003, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    5. Christian Riis, 2010. "Efficient Contests," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 643-665, September.
    6. Michele Bisceglia & Roberto Cellini & Luca Grilli, 2022. "On the dynamic optimality of yardstick regulation," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 315(1), pages 73-92, August.
    7. Angelino Viceisza, 2007. "An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2007-09, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    8. Dijkstra, Peter T. & Haan, Marco A. & Mulder, Machiel, 2017. "Industry structure and collusion with uniform yardstick competition: Theory and experiments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 1-33.
    9. Ayako Suzuki, 2008. "Yardstick Competition to Elicit Private Information: An Empirical Analysis of the Japanese Gas Distribution Industry," ISER Discussion Paper 0709, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    10. Roberta Longo & Marisa Miraldo & Andrew Street, 2008. "Price regulation of pluralistic markets subject to provider collusion," Working Papers 045cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
    11. Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, 2013. "Oligopoly Experiments In The Current Millennium," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 439-460, July.
    12. Daniel Cracau & Benjamin Franz, 2012. "An experimental study of mixed strategy equilibria in simultaneous price-quantity games," FEMM Working Papers 120017, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    13. Frisell, Lars & Roszbach, Kasper & spagnolo, giancarlo, 2008. "Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks," Working Paper Series 221, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    14. Georg Meran & Christian Hirschhausen, 2009. "A modified yardstick competition mechanism," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 223-245, June.
    15. Bisceglia, Michele & Cellini, Roberto & Grilli, Luca, 2019. "On the optimality of the yardstick regulation in the presence of dynamic interaction," MPRA Paper 94946, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Gomez-Martinez, Francisco, 2017. "Partial Cartels and Mergers with Heterogenous Firms: Experimental Evidence," EconStor Preprints 169380, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    17. Ayako Suzuki, 2012. "Yardstick Competition to Elicit Private Information: An Empirical Analysis," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 40(4), pages 313-338, June.
    18. Daniel Cracau & Benjamin Franz, 2014. "An experimental test of the mixed strategy equilibrium in price-quantity oligopolies," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(3), pages 1369-1380.
    19. Fumitoshi Mizutani & Hideo Kozumi & Noriaki Matsushima, 2009. "Does yardstick regulation really work? Empirical evidence from Japan’s rail industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 308-323, December.
    20. Dijkstra, Peter T. & Haan, Marco A. & Mulder, Machiel, 2017. "Design of yardstick competition and consumer prices: Experimental evidence," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 261-271.
    21. Campbell, Alrick, 2018. "Cap prices or cap revenues? The dilemma of electric utility networks," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 802-812.
    22. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
    23. Xu, Le & Yang, Lili & Li, Ding & Shao, Shuai, 2023. "Asymmetric effects of heterogeneous environmental standards on green technology innovation: Evidence from China," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    24. Matsukawa, Isamu, 2019. "Detecting collusion in retail electricity markets: Results from Japan for 2005 to 2010," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 16-23.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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