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Allocating airport slots : a combinatorial auction mechanism

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Gruyer

    (LEEA - ENAC - Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien - ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile)

  • Nathalie Lenoir

    (LEEA - ENAC - Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien - ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile)

Abstract

Nicolas Gruyer and Nathalie Lenoir discuss the current allocation of slots on congested European airport. In their eyes the system of grandfather rights constitutes an obstacle to the effective liberalisation of air transportation undertaken in Europe. In this article they propose to use a market mechanism, based on temporary utilisation licences. In order to allocate those licences, the proposed system is based on a combinatorial auction mechanism where a percentage of licences would be reallocated each season. A secondary market would also be set up in order to reallocate slots during a season. Since combinatorial auctions involve a complex optimisation procedure, we describe how it can be made to work in the case of auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Gruyer & Nathalie Lenoir, 2004. "Allocating airport slots : a combinatorial auction mechanism," Post-Print hal-01021610, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01021610
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://enac.hal.science/hal-01021610
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nicolas Gruyer & Nathalie Lenoir, 2003. "Auctioning airport slots (?)," Economics Working Papers 01, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
    2. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-175, Winter.
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