IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/iepoli/v23y2011i1p118-126.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does spectrum auctioning harm consumers? Lessons from 3G licensing

Author

Listed:
  • Park, Minsoo
  • Lee, Sang-Woo
  • Choi, Yong-Jae

Abstract

Although the auctioning spectrum is generally considered to be highly successful, many countries still rely on beauty contests to assign spectrums. This is often attributed to the negative perceptions about the potential problems that auctions may cause, such as high licensing fees, high consumer prices, a lower incentive to invest in infrastructure, and concerns about market concentration. To address these negative perceptions, this paper estimates the effects of the auctions and the licensing fees for the 3G spectrum on consumer prices, the timing of a new service launch, and the market structure using data from the mobile markets of 21 OECD countries. Although our study uses a relatively small sample and a simple methodology, the results are meaningful since it examines a single service (3G) in OECD countries. Some of these countries have adopted auctions while others have used the traditional beauty contest approach. This combination provides a natural experiment to evaluate the impact of auctions on the mobile telecommunications market. The estimation results show no evidence to support claims of negative effects of spectrum auctions in the mobile communications market. This study calls for more positive action toward spectrum auctions in many countries who seek to improve the efficiency and transparency of spectrum assignment.

Suggested Citation

  • Park, Minsoo & Lee, Sang-Woo & Choi, Yong-Jae, 2011. "Does spectrum auctioning harm consumers? Lessons from 3G licensing," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 118-126, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:23:y:2011:i:1:p:118-126
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-6245(10)00074-0
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emmanuel Guerre & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2000. "Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 525-574, May.
    2. Cramton, Peter & Gibbons, Robert & Klemperer, Paul, 1987. "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 615-632, May.
    3. Peter M. Guadagni & John D. C. Little, 1983. "A Logit Model of Brand Choice Calibrated on Scanner Data," Marketing Science, INFORMS, pages 203-238.
    4. Hong, Han & Shum, Matthew, 2003. "Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, pages 327-358.
    5. Hazlett, Thomas W. & Muñoz, Roberto E., 2009. "Spectrum allocation in Latin America: An economic analysis," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, pages 261-278.
    6. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, pages 159-175.
    7. Jaffee, Dwight & Shleifer, Andrei, 1990. "Costs of Financial Distress, Delayed Calls of Convertible Bonds, and the Role of Investment Banks," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(1), pages 107-123, January.
    8. Thomas W. Hazlett & Roberto E. Muñoz, 2009. "A welfare analysis of spectrum allocation policies," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, pages 424-454.
    9. Cai, Hongbin, 2000. "Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 260-276.
    10. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, 2001. "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 375-417, April.
    11. Paul Klemperer, 2001. "How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions," Economics Papers 2002-W5, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, revised 01 Nov 2001.
    12. Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 829-845, May.
    13. Wruck, Karen Hopper, 1994. "Financial policy, internal control, and performance Sealed Air Corporation's leveraged special dividend," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, pages 157-192.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Halil D. Kaya & Julia S. Kwok, 2016. "A Framework for Telecommunication Auctions," International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, vol. 6(10), pages 128-135, October.
    2. Halil D. Kaya & Julia S. Kwok, 2016. "Foreign Reactions to U.S. Auctions: Implications for U.S. Bidders in Foreign Countries," International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, vol. 6(10), pages 29-43, October.
    3. Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2013. "Multiunit Auctions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 461-490, July.
    4. Zaber, Moinul & Sirbu, Marvin, 2012. "Impact of spectrum management policy on the penetration of 3G technology," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, pages 762-782.
    5. Gomis-Porqueras Pedro & Julien Benoît & Wang Liang, 2018. "Competitive Search with Ex-post Opportunism," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, pages 1-17.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:23:y:2011:i:1:p:118-126. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu) or (). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505549 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.