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A Framework for Telecommunication Auctions

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Listed:
  • Halil D. Kaya
  • Julia S. Kwok

Abstract

In this study, we examine telecommunication auctions and develop a framework of U.S. satellite spectrum licensing, foreign reactions to U.S. decisions, business assessments of opportunities and the feedback to the FCC's policy. This framework views the international licensing process as a series of actions, reactions, and feedbacks. We recommend policy makers to use this framework as a guide. We also recommend future studies on telecommunication auctions to use this framework as their starting point.

Suggested Citation

  • Halil D. Kaya & Julia S. Kwok, 2016. "A Framework for Telecommunication Auctions," International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, vol. 6(10), pages 128-135, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:hur:ijarbs:v:6:y:2016:i:10:p:128-135
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    2. Ken Binmore & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 74-96, March.
    3. Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 829-845, May.
    4. Park, Minsoo & Lee, Sang-Woo & Choi, Yong-Jae, 2011. "Does spectrum auctioning harm consumers? Lessons from 3G licensing," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 118-126, March.
    5. van Damme, E.E.C., 2002. "The European UMTS-auction," Other publications TiSEM c3bdfe22-506b-4ade-91c4-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. van Damme, Eric, 2002. "The European UMTS-auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 846-858, May.
    7. McMillan, John, 1995. "Why auction the spectrum?," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 191-199, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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