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A Nonparametric Test of Exogenous Participation in First-Price Auctions

Listed author(s):
  • Nianqing Liu
  • Yao Luo
Registered author(s):

    This paper proposes a nonparametric test of exogenous participation in first-price auctions. Exogenous participation means that the valuation distribution does not depend on the number of bidders. Our test is motivated by the fact that two valuation distributions are the same if and only if their generalized Lorenz curves are the same. Our method avoids estimating unobserved valuations and does not require smooth estimation of bid density. We show that our test is consistent against all fixed alternatives and has power against root-n local alternatives. Monte Carlo experiments show that our test performs well in finite samples. We implement our method on data from the U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. We also discuss how our test can be adapted to other testing problems in auctions.

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    File URL: https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/tecipa-519.pdf
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    Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number tecipa-519.

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    Length: Unknown pages
    Date of creation: 01 Oct 2014
    Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-519
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    1. Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom, 2008. "Quantile-Based Nonparametric Inference for First-Price Auctions," Microeconomics.ca working papers marmer-08-01-17-12-16-12, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 16 May 2013.
    2. Jun, Sung Jae & Pinkse, Joris & Wan, Yuanyuan, 2010. "A consistent nonparametric test of affiliation in auction models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 159(1), pages 46-54, November.
    3. Lu, Jingfeng & Perrigne, Isabelle, 2006. "Estimating risk aversion from ascending and sealed-bid auctions: the case of timber auction data," MPRA Paper 948, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Samuelson, William F., 1985. "Competitive bidding with entry costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 53-57.
    5. Hanming Fang & Xun Tang, 2013. "Inference of Bidders’ Risk Attitudes in Ascending Auctions with Endogenous Entry," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-056, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    6. Philip A. Haile & Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2003. "Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," NBER Working Papers 10105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Luo, Yao & Perrigne, Isabelle & Vuong, Quang, 2014. "Structural Analysis of Nonlinear Pricing," Working Papers 14-003, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    8. Stephen G. Donald & Garry F. Barrett, 2004. "Consistent Nonparametric Tests for Lorenz Dominance," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 321, Econometric Society.
    9. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2003. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data," Working Papers 03002, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    10. Aryal, Gaurab & Gabrielli, Maria F., 2013. "Testing for collusion in asymmetric first-price auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 26-35.
    11. Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom & Xu, Pai, 2007. "What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach," Microeconomics.ca working papers marmer-07-11-22-02-26-44, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 18 Feb 2011.
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