Laurent Franckx

Personal Details

First Name:	Laurent
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Franckx
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pfr11
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
	Federaal Planbureau Economische analyses en vooruitzichten Kunstlaan 47-49 1000 Brussel Belgium
Twitter:	@laurentfranckx

Affiliation

Federal Planning Bureau
Government of Belgium

Bruxelles/Brussel, Belgium
http://www.plan.be/
RePEc:edi:plagvbe (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Laurent Franckx & Alessio D’Amato†, Isabelle Brose & Isabelle Brose, 2004. "Multi Pollutant Yardstick Schemes as Environmental Policy Tools," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0416, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.

   Cited by:

   1. Jing Xu, 2018. "International environmental agreements with agenda and interaction between pollutants," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 153-174, April.
   2. Ian Mackenzie & Nick Hanley & Tatiana Kornienko, 2008. "The optimal initial allocation of pollution permits: a relative performance approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(3), pages 265-282, March.

2. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Reputation effects in regulatory enforcement," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0107, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.

   Cited by:

   1. François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.

3. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Environmental enforcement with endogenous ambient monitoring," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0115, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
   • Laurent Franckx, 2005. "Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 30(2), pages 195-220, February.

   Cited by:

   1. Zhou, Xiaoxiao & Jia, Mengyu & Wang, Lu & Sharma, Gagan Deep & Zhao, Xin & Ma, Xiaowei, 2022. "Modelling and simulation of a four-group evolutionary game model for green innovation stakeholders: Contextual evidence in lens of sustainable development," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 500-517.
   2. Colson, Gregory & Menapace, Luisa, 2012. "Multiple receptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmental taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 390-401.
   3. Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & Rubbelke, Dirk T.G., 2007. "Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy," Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers 9333, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
      • Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & Rübbelke, Dirk T.G., 2013. "Group rewards and individual sanctions in environmental policy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 38-59.
      • Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2007. "Group rewards and individual sanctions in environmental policy," Discussion Papers 07/01, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
      • Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2007. "Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy," Working Papers 2007.44, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
   4. Deutsch, Yael & Goldberg, Noam & Perlman, Yael, 2019. "Incorporating monitoring technology and on-site inspections into an n-person inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 274(2), pages 627-637.
   5. Dong, Xiaoqing & Li, Chaolin & Li, Ji & Wang, Jia & Huang, Wantao, 2010. "A game-theoretic analysis of implementation of cleaner production policies in the Chinese electroplating industry," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 54(12), pages 1442-1448.
   6. François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.

4. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "ambient environmental inspections in repeated enforcement games," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0112, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.

   Cited by:

   1. Lauro J. Martinez & Shital A. Thekdi & James H. Lambert, 2013. "Modeling energy facility regulatory compliance with application to multi-scale liquefied natural gas facilities," Environment Systems and Decisions, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 404-412, September.
   2. François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.

Articles

1. Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulatory Emission Limits for Cars and the Porter Hypothesis: A Survey of the Literature," Transport Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(6), pages 749-766, November.

   Cited by:

   1. Song, Malin & Du, Juntao & Tan, Kim Hua, 2018. "Impact of fiscal decentralization on green total factor productivity," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 359-367.

2. Alessio D’Amato & Laurent Franckx, 2010. "Nonpoint pollution regulation targeted on emission proxies: the role of yardstick schemes," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 12(4), pages 201-218, December.

   Cited by:

   1. Joschka Gerigk & Ian MacKenzie & Markus Ohndorf, 2015. "A Model of Benchmarking Regulation: Revisiting the Efficiency of Environmental Standards," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(1), pages 59-82, September.
      • Joschka Gerigk & Ian A. MacKenzie & Markus Ohndorf, 2014. "A model of benchmarking regulation: revisiting the efficiency of environmental standards," Discussion Papers Series 519, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.

3. Athanasios Kampas & Laurent Franckx, 2005. "On the Regulatory Choice of Refunding Rules to Reconcile the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ and Pigovian Taxation: An Application," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 23(1), pages 141-152, February.

   Cited by:

   1. Dieter Schmidtchen & Jenny Helstroffer & Christian Koboldt, 2021. "Regulatory failure and the polluter pays principle: why regulatory impact assessment dominates the polluter pays principle," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 23(1), pages 109-144, January.

4. Laurent Franckx, 2005. "Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 30(2), pages 195-220, February.
   • Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Environmental enforcement with endogenous ambient monitoring," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0115, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
   See citations under working paper version above.
5. Laurent Franckx, 2004. "Marginal Deterrence Through Ambient Environmental Inspections," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 51(4), pages 507-527, September.

   Cited by:

   1. Colson, Gregory & Menapace, Luisa, 2012. "Multiple receptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmental taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 390-401.
   2. Detotto, Claudio & McCannon, Bryan C. & Vannini, Marco, 2015. "Evidence of marginal deterrence: Kidnapping and murder in Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 63-67.
      • Claudio Detotto & Bryan Mccannon & Vannini Marco, 2015. "« Evidence of marginal deterrence: Kidnapping and murder in Italy »," Post-Print hal-01289349, HAL.
   3. Heather Eckert & Andrew Eckert, 2010. "The geographic distribution of environmental inspections," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 1-22, February.
   4. François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.
   5. C. Detotto & B. Mccannon & M. Vannini, 2013. "A Note on Marginal Deterrence: Evidence," Working Paper CRENoS 201310, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.

6. Laurent Franckx & Isabelle Brose & Alessio DAmato, 2004. "Multitask Rank Order Tournaments," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(10), pages 1-10.

   Cited by:

   1. Czerny, Achim I. & Fosgerau, Mogens & Jost, Peter-J. & van Ommeren, Jos N., 2019. "Why pay for jobs (and not for tasks)?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 419-433.
   2. Clark, Derek & Konrad, Kai A., 2006. "Contests with multi-tasking [Contests with Multi-Tasking]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-14, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
      • Derek J. Clark & Kai A. Konrad, 2007. "Contests with Multi‐tasking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(2), pages 303-319, June.
      • Clark, Derek J. & Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Contests with multi-tasking," Munich Reprints in Economics 22095, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
      • Clark, Derek J. & Konrad, Kai A., 2006. "Contests with multi-tasking," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 125, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   3. Alessio D’Amato & Laurent Franckx, 2010. "Nonpoint pollution regulation targeted on emission proxies: the role of yardstick schemes," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 12(4), pages 201-218, December.
   4. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition," CARF F-Series CARF-F-213, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
      • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-727, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
      • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role Of Relative And Absolute Performance Evaluations In Intergroup Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 443-454, December.
   5. Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006. "Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-419, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
      • Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006. "Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents," CARF F-Series CARF-F-067, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
   6. Laurent Franckx & Alessio D’Amato†, Isabelle Brose & Isabelle Brose, 2004. "Multi Pollutant Yardstick Schemes as Environmental Policy Tools," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0416, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
   7. Liu, Lirong & Neilson, William, 2013. "Enforcement Leverage with Fixed Inspection Capacity," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 3(4), pages 305-328, August.

7. Franckx Laurent, 2002. "Ambient environmental inspections and commitment towards enforcement policies: substitutes or complements?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-20, January.

   Cited by:

   1. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Environmental enforcement with endogenous ambient monitoring," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0115, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
      • Laurent Franckx, 2005. "Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 30(2), pages 195-220, February.
   2. Colson, Gregory & Menapace, Luisa, 2012. "Multiple receptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmental taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 390-401.

8. Franckx, Laurent, 2002. "The Use of Ambient Inspections in Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement When the Inspection Agency Cannot Commit Itself to Announced Inspection Probabilities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 71-92, January.

   Cited by:

   1. Friesen, Lana, 2006. "The social welfare implications of industry self-auditing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 280-294, May.
   2. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu, 2005. "Tradeable-permit pollution control systems with and without commitment to auditing," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(1), pages 15-37, March.
   3. Inés Macho-Stadler, 2008. "Environmental regulation: choice of instruments under imperfect compliance," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21, March.
      • Inés Macho-Stadler, 2006. "Environmental Regulation: Choice of Instruments under Imperfect Compliance," Working Papers 189, Barcelona School of Economics.
      • Inés Macho-Stadler, 2006. "Environmental Regulation: Choice of Instruments under Imperfect Compliance," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 673.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
   4. Germani, Anna Rita & Morone, Andrea & Morone, Piergiuseppe & Scaramozzino, Pasquale, 2013. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between firms, regulatory agency and justice department: a theoretical and empirical investigation," MPRA Paper 51369, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   5. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "A Note on the Complementarity of Uniform Emission Standards and Monitoring Strategies," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2009/06, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
      • Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "A note on the complementarity of uniform emission standards and monitoring strategies," Working Papers 2009/12, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
   6. Colson, Gregory & Menapace, Luisa, 2012. "Multiple receptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmental taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 390-401.
   7. Heyes, Anthony & Kapur, Sandeep, 2007. "Enforcement Missions: Targets vs Budgets," Working Paper Series 19075, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
      • Heyes, Anthony & Kapur, Sandeep, 2009. "Enforcement missions: Targets vs budgets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 129-140, September.
   8. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David, 2006. "Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 110-131, January.
      • Ines Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2004. "Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms’ Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes," CESifo Working Paper Series 1193, CESifo.
      • Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2004. "Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms' Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 612.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
      • Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2004. "Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firm's Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes," Working Papers 124, Barcelona School of Economics.
   9. Luciano Andreozzi, 2008. "Inspection games with long-run inspectors," Department of Economics Working Papers 0821, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
   10. Herzing, Mathias, 2021. "Multiple equilibria in the context of inspection probabilities depending on firms’ relative emissions," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
   11. Anastasios Xepapadeas, "undated". "Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources," Working Papers 0312, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
       • Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2005. "Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(3), pages 583-599, September.
   12. Constadina Passa & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2004. "Participation in and Compliance with Public Voluntary Environmental Programs: An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers 2004.67, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
       • Anastasios Xepapadeas & Constadina Passa, 2004. "Participation in and Compliance with Public Voluntary Environmental Programs: An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers 0403, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
   13. Stranlund, John K. & Chavez, Carlos A. & Villena, Mauricio G., 2007. "The Optimal Pricing of Pollution When Enforcement is Costly," Working Paper Series 7387, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
       • Stranlund, John K. & Chávez, Carlos A. & Villena, Mauricio G., 2009. "The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 183-191, September.
       • John K. Stranlund & Carlos A. Chavez & Mauricio G. Villena, 2007. "The Optimal Pricing of Pollution When Enforcement is Costly," Working Papers 2007-6, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
   14. Anthony Rossiter & Susan M Hester, 2017. "Designing Biosecurity Inspection Regimes to Account for Stakeholder Incentives: An Inspection Game Approach," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 93(301), pages 277-301, June.
   15. Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & Rubbelke, Dirk T.G., 2007. "Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy," Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers 9333, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
       • Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & Rübbelke, Dirk T.G., 2013. "Group rewards and individual sanctions in environmental policy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 38-59.
       • Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2007. "Group rewards and individual sanctions in environmental policy," Discussion Papers 07/01, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
       • Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2007. "Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy," Working Papers 2007.44, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
   16. Keisaku Higashida, 2019. "Burden of Inspection Costs and Effectiveness of Environmental Regulations," Discussion Paper Series 189, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University.
   17. Anna Rita Germani & Pasquale Scaramozzino & Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2017. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between enforcement agencies and firms: a theoretical and laboratory investigation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 255-284, December.
   18. Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2012. "The Economics of Nonpoint Source Pollution," DEOS Working Papers 1233, Athens University of Economics and Business.
       • Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2011. "The Economics of Non-Point-Source Pollution," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 355-373, October.
   19. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu & Chiung-Yun Chang, 2013. "Commitment or no-commitment to monitoring in emission tax systems?," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 15(2), pages 171-188, April.
   20. Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2003. "Regulation and Evolution of Harvesting Rules and Compliance in Common Pool Resources," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/39, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
   21. Lars Hansen & Signe Krarup & Clifford Russell, 2006. "Enforcement and Information Strategies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 45-61, July.
   22. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu, 2005. "Tradeable-permit pollution control systems with and without commitment to auditing," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(1), pages 15-37, March.
   23. Dong, Xiaoqing & Li, Chaolin & Li, Ji & Wang, Jia & Huang, Wantao, 2010. "A game-theoretic analysis of implementation of cleaner production policies in the Chinese electroplating industry," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 54(12), pages 1442-1448.
   24. François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.
   25. Anastasios Xepapadeas & Constadina Passa, 2005. "Design of Public Voluntary Environmental Programs for Nitrate Pollution in Agriculture: An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers 0512, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
   26. Inés Macho Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, 2005. "Optimal inspection policy and income-tax compliance," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 173(2), pages 9-45, June.
   27. D'Amato, Alessio & Mazzanti, Massimiliano & Nicolli, Francesco & Zoli, Mariangela, 2018. "Illegal waste disposal: Enforcement actions and decentralized environmental policy," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 56-65.
   28. Laurent Franckx, 2004. "Marginal Deterrence Through Ambient Environmental Inspections," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 51(4), pages 507-527, September.

9. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Ambient environmental monitoring, sequential firm inspections and time-decreasing benefits of inspection," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(1), pages 1-10.

   Cited by:

   1. Germani, Anna Rita & Morone, Andrea & Morone, Piergiuseppe & Scaramozzino, Pasquale, 2013. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between firms, regulatory agency and justice department: a theoretical and empirical investigation," MPRA Paper 51369, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   2. Colson, Gregory & Menapace, Luisa, 2012. "Multiple receptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmental taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 390-401.
   3. Anna Rita Germani & Pasquale Scaramozzino & Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2017. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between enforcement agencies and firms: a theoretical and laboratory investigation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 255-284, December.
   4. Laurent Franckx, 2004. "Marginal Deterrence Through Ambient Environmental Inspections," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 51(4), pages 507-527, September.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 22 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-ENE: Energy Economics (13) 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2005-01-16 2014-06-14 2018-01-22 2022-11-28 2024-01-15 2024-01-15. Author is listed
2. NEP-ENT: Entrepreneurship (7) 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27. Author is listed
3. NEP-ENV: Environmental Economics (7) 2004-02-15 2004-02-15 2005-01-16 2010-01-23 2012-10-13 2014-06-14 2019-05-20. Author is listed
4. NEP-NET: Network Economics (7) 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27. Author is listed
5. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (6) 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2002-04-03 2004-02-15 2004-02-15. Author is listed
6. NEP-TRE: Transport Economics (5) 2014-09-05 2018-01-22 2019-05-20 2022-11-28 2024-01-15. Author is listed
7. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2002-04-03 2004-02-15 2005-01-16
8. NEP-ACC: Accounting and Auditing (2) 2022-11-28 2024-01-15
9. NEP-EUR: Microeconomic European Issues (2) 2024-01-15 2024-01-15
10. NEP-RES: Resource Economics (2) 2001-11-05 2012-10-13
11. NEP-URE: Urban and Real Estate Economics (2) 2014-09-05 2018-01-22
12. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2019-05-20
13. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2002-08-19
14. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2002-11-18
15. NEP-CSE: Economics of Strategic Management (1) 2014-06-14
16. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2012-10-13
17. NEP-DCM: Discrete Choice Models (1) 2014-09-05
18. NEP-HEA: Health Economics (1) 2010-01-23
19. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (1) 2012-10-13

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