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Laurent Franckx

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First Name:Laurent
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Last Name:Franckx
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RePEc Short-ID:pfr11
Federaal Planbureau Economische analyses en vooruitzichten Kunstlaan 47-49 1000 Brussel Belgium
Twitter: @laurentfranckx

Research output

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Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Laurent Franckx, 2017. "Working Paper 08-17 - Vehicle stock modelling in long term projections - Survey of the literature," Working Papers 1708, Federal Planning Bureau, Belgium.
  2. Franckx, Laurent & Michiels, Hans & Mayeres, Inge, 2014. "A discrete continuous model of vehicle ownership and use in Flanders," MPRA Paper 58113, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Franckx, Laurent, 2014. "Regulatory emission limits for mobile sources and the Porter hypothesis: a survey of the literature," MPRA Paper 56448, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. de, Vries Frans & Franckx, Laurent, 2012. "A Note on Organizational Design and the Optimal Allocation of Environmental Liability," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2012-09, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
  5. Franckx, Laurent & Van Hyfte, Annick & Bogaert, Sarah & Vermoote, Stijn & Hunt, Alistair, 2009. "Environment related health costs in Flanders," MPRA Paper 20048, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 12 Dec 2009.
  6. Laurent Franckx & F.P. de Vries, 2004. "Environmental Liability and Organizational Structure," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0401, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  7. Laurent Franckx & Alessio D’Amato†, Isabelle Brose & Isabelle Brose, 2004. "Multi Pollutant Yardstick Schemes as Environmental Policy Tools," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0416, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  8. Laurent Franckx & Alessio D'Amato, 2003. "Environmental policy as a multi-task principal-agent problem," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0312, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  9. Laurent Franckx & Alessio d'Amato, 2002. "Multiple-task common agency with one fully-informed principal: implications for public policy," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0206, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  10. Laurent Franckx, 2002. "Penalty and crime with lumpy choices: some further considerations," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0201, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  11. Laurent Franckx & Athanasios Kampas, 2002. "A Note on "The Choice between Emission Taxes and Output Taxes under Imperfect Monitoring"," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0210, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  12. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Reputation effects in regulatory enforcement," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0107, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  13. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Optimal Fines for Environmental Noncompliance Under a Decentralized Enforcement Policy," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0108, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  14. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Ambient environmental inspections eliminate the need for marginal deterrence," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0109, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  15. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Ambient environmental inspections followed by sequential firm inspections," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0104, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  16. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Environmental enforcement with endogenous ambient monitoring," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0115, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  17. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "ambient environmental inspections in repeated enforcement games," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0112, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  18. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Ambient inspections in environmental enforcement: an extension," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0106, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.

Articles

  1. François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.
  2. Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulatory Emission Limits for Cars and the Porter Hypothesis: A Survey of the Literature," Transport Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(6), pages 749-766, November.
  3. Alessio D’Amato & Laurent Franckx, 2010. "Nonpoint pollution regulation targeted on emission proxies: the role of yardstick schemes," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 12(4), pages 201-218, December.
  4. Bruno Deffains & Laurent Franckx, 2009. "Welfare improving ignorance and negligence rule," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 1-7, August.
  5. Athanasios Kampas & Laurent Franckx, 2005. "On the Regulatory Choice of Refunding Rules to Reconcile the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ and Pigovian Taxation: An Application," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 23(1), pages 141-152, February.
  6. Athanasios Kampas & Laurent Franckx, 2005. "On the regulatory choice of refunding rules to reconcile the 'polluter pays principle' and Pigovian taxation: an application," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 23(1), pages 141-152, February.
  7. Laurent Franckx, 2005. "Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 30(2), pages 195-220, February.
  8. Laurent Franckx, 2004. "Marginal Deterrence Through Ambient Environmental Inspections," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 51(4), pages 507-527, September.
  9. Laurent Franckx & Isabelle Brose & Alessio DAmato, 2004. "Multitask Rank Order Tournaments," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(10), pages 1-10.
  10. Laurent Franckx, 2004. "Penalty and Crime with Lumpy Choices," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(4), pages 403-421, October.
  11. Laurent Franckx & Isabelle Brose, 2004. "A theoretical framework for incentives in the public sector," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(2), pages 1-8.
  12. Laurent Franckx & Athanasios Kampas, 2003. "``The choice between emission taxes and output taxes under imperfect monitoring": a comment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(1), pages 1-7.
  13. Franckx Laurent, 2002. "Ambient environmental inspections and commitment towards enforcement policies: substitutes or complements?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-20, January.
  14. Franckx, Laurent, 2002. "The Use of Ambient Inspections in Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement When the Inspection Agency Cannot Commit Itself to Announced Inspection Probabilities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 71-92, January.
  15. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Ambient environmental monitoring, sequential firm inspections and time-decreasing benefits of inspection," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(1), pages 1-10.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Laurent Franckx & Alessio D’Amato†, Isabelle Brose & Isabelle Brose, 2004. "Multi Pollutant Yardstick Schemes as Environmental Policy Tools," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0416, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.

    Cited by:

    1. Jing Xu, 2018. "International environmental agreements with agenda and interaction between pollutants," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 153-174, April.
    2. Ian Mackenzie & Nick Hanley & Tatiana Kornienko, 2008. "The optimal initial allocation of pollution permits: a relative performance approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(3), pages 265-282, March.

  2. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Reputation effects in regulatory enforcement," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0107, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.

    Cited by:

    1. François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.

  3. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Environmental enforcement with endogenous ambient monitoring," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0115, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.

    Cited by:

    1. Colson, Gregory & Menapace, Luisa, 2012. "Multiple receptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmental taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 390-401.
    2. Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2007. "Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy," Working Papers 2007.44, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.

  4. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "ambient environmental inspections in repeated enforcement games," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0112, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.

    Cited by:

    1. François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.

Articles

  1. Alessio D’Amato & Laurent Franckx, 2010. "Nonpoint pollution regulation targeted on emission proxies: the role of yardstick schemes," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 12(4), pages 201-218, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Joschka Gerigk & Ian MacKenzie & Markus Ohndorf, 2015. "A Model of Benchmarking Regulation: Revisiting the Efficiency of Environmental Standards," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(1), pages 59-82, September.

  2. Laurent Franckx, 2005. "Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 30(2), pages 195-220, February.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Laurent Franckx, 2004. "Marginal Deterrence Through Ambient Environmental Inspections," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 51(4), pages 507-527, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Colson, Gregory & Menapace, Luisa, 2012. "Multiple receptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmental taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 390-401.
    2. Detotto, Claudio & McCannon, Bryan C. & Vannini, Marco, 2015. "Evidence of marginal deterrence: Kidnapping and murder in Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 63-67.
    3. Heather Eckert & Andrew Eckert, 2010. "The geographic distribution of environmental inspections," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 1-22, February.
    4. François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.
    5. C. Detotto & BC. McCannon & M. Vannini, 2013. "A Note on Marginal Deterrence: Evidence," Working Paper CRENoS 201310, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.

  4. Laurent Franckx & Isabelle Brose & Alessio DAmato, 2004. "Multitask Rank Order Tournaments," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(10), pages 1-10.

    Cited by:

    1. Clark, Derek & Konrad, Kai A., 2006. "Contests with multi-tasking
      [Contests with Multi-Tasking]
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2006-14, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    2. Alessio D’Amato & Laurent Franckx, 2010. "Nonpoint pollution regulation targeted on emission proxies: the role of yardstick schemes," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 12(4), pages 201-218, December.
    3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role of Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations in Intergroup Competition," CARF F-Series CARF-F-213, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    4. Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006. "Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-419, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    5. Laurent Franckx & Alessio D’Amato†, Isabelle Brose & Isabelle Brose, 2004. "Multi Pollutant Yardstick Schemes as Environmental Policy Tools," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0416, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    6. Liu, Lirong & Neilson, William, 2013. "Enforcement Leverage with Fixed Inspection Capacity," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 3(4), pages 305-328, August.

  5. Franckx Laurent, 2002. "Ambient environmental inspections and commitment towards enforcement policies: substitutes or complements?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-20, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Environmental enforcement with endogenous ambient monitoring," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0115, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    2. Colson, Gregory & Menapace, Luisa, 2012. "Multiple receptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmental taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 390-401.

  6. Franckx, Laurent, 2002. "The Use of Ambient Inspections in Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement When the Inspection Agency Cannot Commit Itself to Announced Inspection Probabilities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 71-92, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Heyes, Anthony & Kapur, Sandeep, 2007. "Enforcement Missions: Targets vs Budgets," Working Paper Series 3975, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    2. Friesen, Lana, 2006. "The social welfare implications of industry self-auditing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 280-294, May.
    3. Inés Macho-Stadler, 2008. "Environmental regulation: choice of instruments under imperfect compliance," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21, March.
    4. Germani, Anna Rita & Morone, Andrea & Morone, Piergiuseppe & Scaramozzino, Pasquale, 2013. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between firms, regulatory agency and justice department: a theoretical and empirical investigation," MPRA Paper 51369, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "A Note on the Complementarity of Uniform Emission Standards and Monitoring Strategies," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2009/06, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
    6. Colson, Gregory & Menapace, Luisa, 2012. "Multiple receptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmental taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 390-401.
    7. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David, 2006. "Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 110-131, January.
    8. Luciano Andreozzi, 2008. "Inspection games with long-run inspectors," Department of Economics Working Papers 0821, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    9. Pauli Lappi, 2016. "The welfare ranking of prices and quantities under noncompliance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(2), pages 269-288, April.
    10. Anastasios Xepapadeas, "undated". "Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources," Working Papers 0312, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    11. Constadina Passa & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2004. "Participation in and Compliance with Public Voluntary Environmental Programs: An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers 2004.67, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    12. Anthony Rossiter & Susan M Hester, 2017. "Designing Biosecurity Inspection Regimes to Account for Stakeholder Incentives: An Inspection Game Approach," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 93(301), pages 277-301, June.
    13. Anna Rita Germani & Pasquale Scaramozzino & Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2017. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between enforcement agencies and firms: a theoretical and laboratory investigation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 255-284, December.
    14. Anastasios Xepapadeas, "undated". "The Economics of Nonpoint Source Pollution," DEOS Working Papers 1233, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    15. Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2007. "Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy," Working Papers 2007.44, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    16. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu & Chiung-Yun Chang, 2013. "Commitment or no-commitment to monitoring in emission tax systems?," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 15(2), pages 171-188, April.
    17. Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2003. "Regulation and Evolution of Harvesting Rules and Compliance in Common Pool Resources," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/39, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
    18. Lars Hansen & Signe Krarup & Clifford Russell, 2006. "Enforcement and Information Strategies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 45-61, July.
    19. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu, 2005. "Tradeable-permit pollution control systems with and without commitment to auditing," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(1), pages 15-37, March.
    20. François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.
    21. Anastasios Xepapadeas & Constadina Passa, 2005. "Design of Public Voluntary Environmental Programs for Nitrate Pollution in Agriculture: An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers 0512, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    22. Stranlund, John K. & Chávez, Carlos A. & Villena, Mauricio G., 2009. "The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 183-191, September.
    23. Inés Macho Stadler & David Perez-Castrillo, 2005. "Optimal inspection policy and income-tax compliance," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 173(2), pages 9-45, June.
    24. Carmen Arguedas & Sandra Rousseau, 2015. "Emission Standards and Monitoring Strategies in a Hierarchical Setting," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 60(3), pages 395-412, March.

  7. Laurent Franckx, 2001. "Ambient environmental monitoring, sequential firm inspections and time-decreasing benefits of inspection," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(1), pages 1-10.

    Cited by:

    1. Germani, Anna Rita & Morone, Andrea & Morone, Piergiuseppe & Scaramozzino, Pasquale, 2013. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between firms, regulatory agency and justice department: a theoretical and empirical investigation," MPRA Paper 51369, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Colson, Gregory & Menapace, Luisa, 2012. "Multiple receptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmental taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 390-401.
    3. Anna Rita Germani & Pasquale Scaramozzino & Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2017. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between enforcement agencies and firms: a theoretical and laboratory investigation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 255-284, December.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 18 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-ENE: Energy Economics (10) 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2005-01-16 2014-06-14 2018-01-22. Author is listed
  2. NEP-ENT: Entrepreneurship (7) 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27. Author is listed
  3. NEP-NET: Network Economics (7) 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27. Author is listed
  4. NEP-ENV: Environmental Economics (6) 2004-02-15 2004-02-15 2005-01-16 2010-01-23 2012-10-13 2014-06-14. Author is listed
  5. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (6) 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2001-11-27 2002-04-03 2004-02-15 2004-02-15. Author is listed
  6. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2002-04-03 2004-02-15 2005-01-16
  7. NEP-RES: Resource Economics (2) 2001-11-05 2012-10-13
  8. NEP-TRE: Transport Economics (2) 2014-09-05 2018-01-22
  9. NEP-URE: Urban & Real Estate Economics (2) 2014-09-05 2018-01-22
  10. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2002-08-19
  11. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2002-11-18
  12. NEP-CSE: Economics of Strategic Management (1) 2014-06-14
  13. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (1) 2012-10-13
  14. NEP-DCM: Discrete Choice Models (1) 2014-09-05
  15. NEP-HEA: Health Economics (1) 2010-01-23
  16. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (1) 2012-10-13

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