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ambient environmental inspections in repeated enforcement games

Author

Listed:
  • Laurent Franckx

    (K.U.Leuven, C.E.S., Energy, Transport and Environment
    Royal Military Academy)

Abstract

We consider an environmental inspection agency who credibly commits to a permanent observation of ambient pollution at the property line of individual firms. In this setting, standard results in the theory of repeated games generalize to enforcement games. The inspection agency obtains partial compliance without ever penalizing the polluter, even in settings where it would never obtain any compliance in the stage game. We identify under which conditions this is an improvement compared to a game where the agency does not collect prior information. Both equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium behavior can be given a nice intuitive interpretation.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent Franckx, 2001. "ambient environmental inspections in repeated enforcement games," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0112, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    • Handle: RePEc:ete:etewps:ete0112
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    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://feb.kuleuven.be/drc/Economics/misc/ete_workingpapers/ete-wp01-12.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Lauro J. Martinez & Shital A. Thekdi & James H. Lambert, 2013. "Modeling energy facility regulatory compliance with application to multi-scale liquefied natural gas facilities," Environment Systems and Decisions, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 404-412, September.
    2. François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    environmental enforcement; repeated games;

    JEL classification:

    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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