A Note on Marginal Deterrence: Evidence
Empirical evidence of the marginal deterrent effect is provided. Exploring a data set of kidnapping crimes in Sardinia between 1960 and 2012 changes in Italian policy regarding sanctions for kidnapping and their associated impact on murders is considered. Deaths associated with kidnappings increase in prevalence when the kidnapping sanction increased, causing a decrease the marginal sanction for murder. Death rates reversed when enhanced sanctions for murder were later introduced.
|Date of creation:||2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.crenos.unica.it/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert B. Ekelund Jr. & John D. Jackson & Rand W. Ressler & Robert D. Tollison, 2006. "Marginal Deterrence and Multiple Murders," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 521-541, January.
- Detotto, Claudio & Pulina, Manuela, 2010. "Assessing substitution and complementary effects amongst crime typologies," MPRA Paper 20046, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1994. "Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 1039-66, October.
- Laurent Franckx, 2004. "Marginal Deterrence Through Ambient Environmental Inspections," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 51(4), pages 507-527, 09.
- Shavell, Steven, 1992. "A note on marginal deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 345-355, September.
- Erkki Koskela & Matti Viren, 1997. "An occupational choice model of crime switching," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(5), pages 655-660.
- M. Vannini & B. McCannon & C. Detotto, 2012. "Understanding Ransom Kidnapping and Its Duration," Working Paper CRENoS 201219, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
- Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen, 2011. "Antitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-166/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- George J. Stigler, 1974.
"The Optimum Enforcement of Laws,"
in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Shepherd, Joanna M, 2002. "Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California's Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 159-201, January.
- Friedman, David & Sjostrom, William, 1993. "Hanged for a Sheep--The Economics of Marginal Deterrence," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 345-66, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cns:cnscwp:201310. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Antonello Pau)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.