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Marginal Deterrence When Offenders Act Sequentially

Author

Listed:
  • Tim Friehe

    (University of Bonn)

  • Thomas J. Miceli

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

Marginal deterrence concerns the incentives created by criminal penalties for o enders to refrain from committing more harmful acts. We show that when offenders act sequentially, it is often optimal for the level of the sanction, not just the expected sanction, to rise with the severity of the act, even when enforcement is specific.

Suggested Citation

  • Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "Marginal Deterrence When Offenders Act Sequentially," Working papers 2014-09, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2014-09
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1994. "Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 1039-1066, October.
    2. Spier, Kathryn E, 1994. "Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 84-95, April.
    3. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2007. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.
    4. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Shavell, Steven, 1992. "A note on marginal deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 345-355, September.
    6. Wilde, Louis L., 1992. "Criminal choice, nonmonetary sanctions and marginal deterrence: A normative analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 333-344, September.
    7. Friedman, David & Sjostrom, William, 1993. "Hanged for a Sheep--The Economics of Marginal Deterrence," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 345-366, June.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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