Focusing law enforcement when offenders can choose location
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- Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "Focusing Law Enforcement When Offenders Can Choose Location," Working papers 2014-15, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "Focusing Law Enforcement When Offenders Can Choose Location," Working papers 2014-31, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsCrime; Deterrence; Focused enforcement; Allocation of police;
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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