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Competition in Crime Deterrence

Author

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  • Nicolas Marceau

Abstract

This paper studies competition between jurisdictions in the eradication of crime. In one story, criminals choose the jurisdiction in which they will commit their crimes while jurisdictions choose the amount of resources devoted to deterrence to protect local production. In another story, the criminals cannot change jurisdictions but they can not rob the owners of mobile capital. Jurisdictions choose the amount of resources devoted to the deterrence of local crime so as to secure property rights and to attract capital. In both stories, competition between jurisdictions leads to overdeterrence relative to the Pareto optimal level.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Marceau, 1997. "Competition in Crime Deterrence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 844-854, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:30:y:1997:i:4:p:844-54
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 2011. "Competition in law enforcement and capital allocation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 136-147, January.
    2. Guillaume Cheikbossian & Nicolas Marceau, 2007. "Why Is Law Enforcement Decentralized?," Cahiers de recherche 0719, CIRPEE.
    3. Petros G. Sekeris & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2020. "An Economic Analysis of Violent Crime," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 975-999.
    4. Ligthart, J.E. & Rider, M. & Wang, R., 2013. "Does the Fiscal Decentralization Promote Public Safety? Evidence from United States," Discussion Paper 2013-021, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Rosario Crinó & Giovanni Immordino & Salvatore Piccolo, 2021. "Criminal mobility, fugitives, and extradition rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(1), pages 69-104, February.
    6. Louis Hotte & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2008. "Individual protection against property crime: decomposing the effects of protection observability," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(2), pages 537-563, May.
    7. da Matta, Rafael Almeida & Andrade, Mônica Viegas, 2011. "A model of local crime displacement," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 30-36, March.
    8. David Weisburd & Cody W. Telep & Doron Teichman & Charlotte E. Gill & Zoe Vitter, 2011. "PROTOCOL: Displacement of Crime and Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits in Large‐Scale Geographic Areas," Campbell Systematic Reviews, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(1), pages 1-38.
    9. B. Curtis Eaton, 2004. "The elementary economics of social dilemmas," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(4), pages 805-829, November.
    10. Naranjo, Alberto J., 2010. "Spillover effects of domestic law enforcement policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 265-275, September.
    11. Ken Yahagi & Susumu Cato, 2023. "Strategic crackdown on organized crime by local governments," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 237-257, June.
    12. Kangoh Lee & Santiago M. Pinto, 2009. "Crime In A Multi‐Jurisdictional Model With Private And Public Prevention," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(5), pages 977-996, December.
    13. Friehe, Tim & Miceli, Thomas J., 2015. "Focusing law enforcement when offenders can choose location," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 105-112.
    14. Monheim-Helstroffer, Jenny & Obidzinski, Marie, 2010. "Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 86-97, March.
    15. Spader, Jonathan & Schuetz, Jenny & Cortes, Alvaro, 2016. "Fewer vacants, fewer crimes? Impacts of neighborhood revitalization policies on crime," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 73-84.
    16. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 1999. "Dissuader le crime : un survol," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 123-147, mars-juin.
    17. Mark Koyama, 2012. "Prosecution Associations in Industrial Revolution England: Private Providers of Public Goods?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 95-130.
    18. Tim Friehe & Thomas J. Miceli, 2016. "Law Enforcement in a Federal System: On the Strategic Choice of Sanction Levels," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 73-103.
    19. des Places, Segolene Barbou & Deffains, Bruno, 2003. "Cooperation in the shadow of regulatory competition: the case of asylum legislation in Europe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 345-364, December.
    20. Friehe, Tim & Pham, Cat Lam & Miceli, Thomas J., 2018. "Law enforcement in a federal system: Endogenous timing of decentralized enforcement effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 134-141.
    21. Anna Harvey, 2020. "Applying regression discontinuity designs to American political development," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(3), pages 377-399, December.

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