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An Economic Analysis of Violent Crim

Author

Listed:
  • Petros Sekeris

    (Groupe Sup de Co Montpellier (GSCM) - Montpellier Business School)

  • Tanguy van Ypersele

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In this article we propose a theoretical model to better comprehend the effect of gun laws on violent property crime. We assume that a violent encounter between a criminal and a victim is costly to both, and we uncover two types of equilibria: a pure strategy violent equilibrium and a mixed strategy equilibrium where the criminal is deterred with strictly positive probability. The effect of a relaxation of gun laws is shown to be conditional on both initial gun laws and on the relative improvement of the victims' defense capacity relative to the criminals' offense capacity. We uncover a potentially inverted U-shaped relationship between gun laws leniency and investments in violent activities which helps reconciling seemingly contradictory empirical findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Petros Sekeris & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2020. "An Economic Analysis of Violent Crim," Post-Print hal-03607608, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03607608
    DOI: 10.3917/redp.306.0133
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-03607608
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    crime; gun laws; deterrence; contrôle des armes à feu; dissuasion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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