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Private Protection and Public Policing

Author

Listed:
  • Ross Hickey

    (Melbourne Institute: Applied Economic & Social Research, The University of Melbourne)

  • Steeve Mongrain

    (Simon Fraser University)

  • Joanne Roberts

    (Yale-NUS)

  • Tanguy van Ypersele

    (Aix-Marseille University – AMSE)

Abstract

This paper looks carefully at situations in which public and private protection are complementary, that is, when private protection must be coordinated with public protection to be effective. For example, home alarms deter theft by being connected to a local police station: if the police do not respond to a home alarm, the home alarm on its own is virtually useless in halting a crime in action. We make a distinction between gross and net complementarity and substitution, where the latter takes into account the effect on the crime rate. We show that when public and private protection are complements the optimal provision of public protection trades offs the manipulation effect of encouraging private protection with the compensatory effect of providing protection to households that do not privately invest. We discuss the implications of our results for policy and empirical research in this area.

Suggested Citation

  • Ross Hickey & Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2019. "Private Protection and Public Policing," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2019n04, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
    • Handle: RePEc:iae:iaewps:wp2019n04
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Petros G. Sekeris & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2020. "An Economic Analysis of Violent Crime," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 975-999.
    2. Friehe, Tim & Mungan, Murat C., 2022. "Private protection against crime and public policing: Political economy considerations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
    3. Bruno Decreuse & Steeve Mongrain & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2022. "Property crime and private protection allocation within cities: Theory and evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(3), pages 1142-1163, July.
    4. Rim Lahmandi‐Ayed & Hejer Lasram & Didier Laussel, 2021. "Is partial privatization of universities a solution for higher education?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(6), pages 1174-1198, December.
    5. Rim Lahmandi-Ayed & Hejer Lasram & Didier Laussel, 2020. "Is partial privatization of universities a solution for higher education? A successive monopolies model," Working Papers hal-02988323, HAL.
    6. Francis Petterini & Akauã Flores, 2021. "Copula econometrics to simulate effects of private policing on crime," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 41(3), pages 1241-1254.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    crime; private protection; policing; externalities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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