Individual Protection Against Property Crime: Decomposing the Effects of Protection Observability
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- Louis Hotte & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2008. "Individual protection against property crime: decomposing the effects of protection observability," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(2), pages 537-563, May.
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More about this item
Keywordscrime; efficiency; private protection;
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2005-12-09 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2005-12-09 (Regulation)
- NEP-URE-2005-12-09 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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