Social Welfare and the Benefits to Crime
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More about this item
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- H0 - Public Economics - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2012-09-03 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-09-03 (Microeconomics)
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