Integrating Market Alternatives Into The Economic Theory Of Optimal Deterrence
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Cited by:
- Thomas J. Miceli & Murat C. Mungan, 2021. "The limit of law: factors influencing the decision to make harmful acts illegal," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 293-307, September.
- Curry Philip A., 2017. "Malice Aforethought," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-18, March.
- Lisa R. Anderson & Gregory DeAngelo & Winand Emons & Beth Freeborn & Hannes Lang, 2017.
"Penalty Structures And Deterrence In A Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1833-1867, October.
- Emons, Winand & Anderson, Lisa R. & Freeborn, Beth & Lang, Jan, 2015. "Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 10576, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lisa R. Anderson & Gregory DeAngelo & Winand Emons & Beth Freeborn & Hannes Lang, 2015. "Penalty Structures and Deterrence in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence," Diskussionsschriften dp1505, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Thomas J. Miceli, 2021. "Should Offenders’ Gains Be Counted? On Efficient Crimes and Unjust Laws," Working papers 2021-02, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Murat C. Mungan, 2017. "Over-incarceration and disenfranchisement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 377-395, September.
- Alex Raskolnikov, 2020. "Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Missing Literature," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 1-59.
- Murat C. Mungan & Thomas J. Miceli, 2021. "Legislating for profit and optimal Eighth‐Amendment review," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 1403-1416, July.
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