Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution
In this I article derive the relationship between the optimal penalty and the probability of apprehension when victim precaution is taken into account. I show that in the area of intentional offenses, the optimal penalty is less than the level that internalizes the victim's harm plus the state's cost of enforcement.
Volume (Year): 27 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
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