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An Economic Analysis of Maritime Piracy and its Control

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  • Paul Hallwood
  • Thomas J. Miceli

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  • Paul Hallwood & Thomas J. Miceli, 2013. "An Economic Analysis of Maritime Piracy and its Control," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 60(4), pages 343-359, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:60:y:2013:i:4:p:343-359
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/sjpe.12014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    2. Boadway, Robin & Marceau, Nicolas & Marchand, Maurice, 1996. "Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 51(2), pages 149-165.
    3. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    5. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. James A. Fawcett, 2010. "Challenges to apprehension and prosecution of East African maritime pirates," Maritime Policy & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(7), pages 753-765, December.
    7. Matthew Baker & Thomas Miceli, 2005. "Credible Criminal Enforcement," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 5-15, July.
    8. Lewin, Jeff L. & Trumbull, William N., 1990. "The social value of crime?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 271-284, December.
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    10. Hong, Nong & Ng, Adolf K.Y., 2010. "The international legal instruments in addressing piracy and maritime terrorism: A critical review," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 51-60.
    11. Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-1288, December.
    12. Sami Bensassi & Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, 2012. "How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy to the International Community?," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 869-883, November.
    13. Helen B Bendall, 2010. "Cost of piracy: A comparative voyage approach," Maritime Economics & Logistics, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association of Maritime Economists (IAME), vol. 12(2), pages 178-195, June.
    14. Naranjo, Alberto J., 2010. "Spillover effects of domestic law enforcement policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 265-275, September.
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    16. Lueck, Dean, 1995. "The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 393-436, October.
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    19. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1049-1094, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kenneth S. Chan & Jean‐Pierre Laffargue, 2020. "Is piracy sustainable?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 321-340, February.
    2. Olaf Jonkeren & Piet Rietveld, 2016. "Protection of Critical Waterborne Transport Infrastructures: An Economic Review," Transport Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(4), pages 437-453, July.
    3. Paul Hallwood & Thomas J. Miceli, 2014. "Modern Maritime Piracy," Working papers 2014-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    4. Lewis, Justin S., 2016. "Maritime piracy confrontations across the globe: Can crew action shape the outcomes?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 116-122.
    5. Obed B.C. Ndikom & Buhari Sodiq Olusegun, 2019. "The Presidential Order and Challenges of the Maritime Sector in Nigeria," International Journal of Science and Business, IJSAB International, vol. 3(4), pages 117-133.

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