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Is piracy sustainable?

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  • Kenneth S. Chan
  • Jean‐Pierre Laffargue

Abstract

We develop a model of international trade between three countries, one of which hosts pirates. When the number of pirate ships increases, the probability for one of the pirate ships (for one commercial ship) encountering a commercial (pirate) ship decreases (increases). Then, the commercial ships have an incentive to spend more on defence and pirate ships to invest less on attack. If pirates operate under free entry, they do not internalize the entry externality. Then, their number rises until it reaches a level such that their attack power has become negligible and the defence of the commercial ships has reached a high level. The economy settles in a full deterrence equilibrium. However, if the number of pirate ships is controlled by an authority, which maximizes piracy's profit, the economy settles in an equilibrium where piracy is active and commercial ships spend less on defence. Piracy is a substitute for trade. Piracy depends on the terms of trade of the pirate country and on the relative efficiency of the attack versus the defence. La piraterie est‐elle soutenable? Nous développons un modèle de commerce international entre trois pays, dont l’un d’entre eux héberge des pirates. Quand le nombre de bateaux pirates augmente la probabilité pour l’un d’entre eux (pour un navire commercial) de rencontrer un navire commercial (un bateau pirate) diminue (augmente). En conséquence, les navires commerciaux sont incités à dépenser plus sur leur capacité de défense et les bateaux pirates à dépenser moins sur leurs capacités d’attaque. En l’absence de barrière à l’entrée dans l’activité de piraterie, les pirates n’internalisent pas l’externalité générée par l’élévation de leur nombre et celui‐ci augmente jusqu’à ce qu’il atteigne un niveau tel que leur capacité d’attaque soit devenue négligeable, alors que la capacité de défense des navires commerciaux a atteint un niveau élevé. L’économie s’installe alors dans un équilibre de dissuasion complète. Cependant, si le nombre de bateaux pirates est contrôlé par une autorité qui maximise la somme de leurs profits, l’économie s’installe dans un équilibre où la piraterie est active et où les navires commerciaux dépensent moins sur leur capacité de défense. La piraterie est une activité substituable au commerce. Son ampleur dépend du terme de l’échange du pays qui héberge les pirates et de l’efficacité des moyens de défense des navires commerciaux relativement à ceux d’attaque des bateaux pirates.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth S. Chan & Jean‐Pierre Laffargue, 2020. "Is piracy sustainable?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 321-340, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:53:y:2020:i:1:p:321-340
    DOI: 10.1111/caje.12427
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