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Commercial Policy in a Predatory World

  • James E. Anderson

Mutual causation of predation and trade induces novel effects of commercial policy in this paper. The model can explain trade volume responses to market widening initiatives that are otherwise puzzlingly 'too big' or 'too small'. Efficient commercial policy (broadly defined) depends crucially on the strength of enforcement. Externalities arising between traders are normally internalized by subsidizing (taxing) trade when enforcement is weak (strong). Efficient regional policy squeezes weak enforcement markets while subsidizing strong enforcement markets. Tolerance (intolerance) of smuggling is rational when enforcement is weak (strong).

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 12576.

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Date of creation: Oct 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12576
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  1. James E. Anderson, 2003. "Traders, Cops and Robbers," NBER Working Papers 9572, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Schiff, Maurice & Winters, L. Alan, 1997. "Regional integration as diplomacy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1801, The World Bank.
  3. Avinash Dixit, 2001. "On Modes of Economic Governance," CESifo Working Paper Series 589, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. James E. Anderson & Eric van Wincoop, 2004. "Trade Costs," NBER Working Papers 10480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 2000. "Guns, Butter, and Openness: On The Relationship Between Security and Trade," Papers 00-01-23, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  6. James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, S.J., 1999. "Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An Empirical Investigation," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 418, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 03 Aug 2000.
  7. James E. Anderson & Eric van Wincoop, 2001. "Borders, Trade and Welfare," NBER Working Papers 8515, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. James A. Brander, 1995. "Strategic Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 5020, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. James E. Anderson, 2008. "Economic Integration and the Civilising Commerce Hypothesis," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 141-157, 01.
  10. repec:ags:afjare:141665 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2002. "Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 133-146, January.
  12. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Maurice Schiff & L. Alan Winters, 2003. "Regional Integration and Development," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15172.
  14. James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, 2005. "Anarchy And Autarky: Endogenous Predation As A Barrier To Trade," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(1), pages 189-213, 02.
  15. BRUNETTI, AYMO AART OLIVER & Kisunko,Gregory & Weder,Beatrice Silvia, 1997. "Institutional obstacles to doing business : region-by-region results from a worldwide survey of the private sector," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1759, The World Bank.
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