Does trade foster contract enforcement?
Contract enforcement is probabilistic, but the probability depends on rules and processes. A stimulus to trade may induce traders to alter rules or processes to improve enforcement. In the model of this paper, such a positive knock-on effect occurs when the elasticity of supply of traders is sufficiently high. Negative knock-on is possible when the elasticity is low. Enforcement strategies in competing markets are complements (substitutes) if the supply of traders is sufficiently elastic (inelastic). The model provides a useful structure of endogenous enforcement that gives promise of explaining patterns of institutional development.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Volume (Year): 41 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/199/PS2|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- James E. Anderson, 2008.
"Economic Integration and the Civilising Commerce Hypothesis,"
The World Economy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 141-157, 01.
- James E. Anderson, 2005. "Economic Integration and the Civilizing Commerce Hypothesis," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 673, Boston College Department of Economics.
- James E. Anderson & Eric van Wincoop, 2004.
NBER Working Papers
10480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Caballero, R-J & Hammour, M-L, 1996.
"The Macroeconomics of Specificity,"
96-25, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- James E. Anderson, 2003.
"Traders, Cops and Robbers,"
NBER Working Papers
9572, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, 2002.
"Insecurity And The Pattern Of Trade: An Empirical Investigation,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 342-352, May.
- James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, S.J., 1999. "Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An Empirical Investigation," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 418, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 03 Aug 2000.
- James E. Rauch & Vitor Trindade, 1999.
"Ethnic Chinese Networks in International Trade,"
NBER Working Papers
7189, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Maurice Schiff & L. Alan Winters, 2003. "Regional Integration and Development," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15172.
- Baier, Scott L. & Bergstrand, Jeffrey H., 2001. "The growth of world trade: tariffs, transport costs, and income similarity," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 1-27, February.
- James E. Rauch & Vitor Trindade, 2003. "Information, International Substitutability, and Globalization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 775-791, June.
- Anderson James E & Young Leslie, 2006. "Trade and Contract Enforcement," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-36, November.
- Schiff, Maurice & Winters, L. Alan, 1997.
"Regional integration as diplomacy,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
1801, The World Bank.
- Dani Rodrik, 1997. "Has Globalization Gone Too Far?," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 57.
- repec:ags:afjare:141665 is not listed on IDEAS
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:41:y:2009:i:1:p:105-130. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.