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The Macroeconomics of Specificity

  • Caballero, R-J
  • Hammour, M-L

Specific quasi-rents build up in a wide variety of economic relationships, and are exposed to opportunism unless fully protected by contract. The recognition that such contracts are often incomplete has yielded major insights into the organization of microeconomic exchange. Rent appropriation, we argue, also has important macroeconomic implications.

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Paper provided by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 96-25.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mit:worpap:96-25
Contact details of provider: Postal: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA
Phone: (617) 253-3361
Fax: (617) 253-1330
Web page: http://econ-www.mit.edu/

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  15. repec:fth:harver:1418 is not listed on IDEAS
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