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Terrorism, Trade and Public Policy

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  • James E. Anderson

    (Boston College)

Abstract

Are bigger markets safer? How should government policy respond to terrorist threats? Trade draws potential terrorists and economic predators into productive activity, but trade also draws terrorist attacks. Larger trade reduces the risk of terrorist attack when the wage elasticity is high, associated with low ratios of predators to prey and high wages; but it may increase the risk of terrorist attack when the wage elasticity is low, associated with high ratios of predators to prey. Anti-terrorist trade policy should always promote trade in simultaneous play. Government first mover advantage and inelastic wage may imply trade restriction. Tolerance of smuggling may improve security. Better enforcement should ordinarily be provided for bigger, inherently safer and higher wage markets.

Suggested Citation

  • James E. Anderson, 2008. "Terrorism, Trade and Public Policy," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 701, Boston College Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:701
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    File URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/wp701.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mirza, Daniel & Verdier, Thierry, 2006. "International trade, security, and transnational terrorism : theory and empirics," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4093, The World Bank.
    2. Daniel Mirza & Thierry Verdier, 2014. "Are Lives a Substitute for Livelihoods? Terrorism, Security, and US Bilateral Imports," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 58(6), pages 943-975, September.
    3. repec:ags:afjare:141665 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova, 2003. "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 119-144, Fall.
    5. Anderson, James E. & Bandiera, Oriana, 2006. "Traders, cops and robbers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 197-215, September.
    6. James E. Anderson & Eric van Wincoop, 2004. "Trade Costs," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(3), pages 691-751, September.
    7. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2008. "Globalization and domestic conflict," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 296-308, December.
    8. ., 2006. "International Trade," Chapters, in: David Alexander Clark (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Development Studies, chapter 60, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. James E. Anderson, 2006. "Commercial Policy in a Predatory World," NBER Working Papers 12576, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. De Sousa, José & Mirza, Daniel & Verdier, Thierry, 2018. "Terror networks and trade: Does the neighbor hurt?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 27-56.
    2. Malik, Zahra & Zaman, Khalid, 2013. "Macroeconomic consequences of terrorism in Pakistan," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1103-1123.
    3. Stacy Julius & Nnanna P. Azu & Maimuna Y. Muhammad, 2019. "Assessing the Impact of Terrorism in Trade Development in the SADC Region: A Gravity Model Approach," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 9(10), pages 1147-1159, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    terrorism; trade; policy; predation; smuggling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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