Modern Maritime Piracy
This essay provides and economic analysis of the problem of modern-day maritime piracy. The essay first reviews the current scope of the problem, and then develops an economic of model of piracy that emphasizes the strategic interaction between the efforts of pirates to locate potential targets, and shippers to avoid contact. The model provides the basis for deriving an optimal enforcement policy, which is then compared to actual enforcement efforts, which, for a variety of reasons, have largely been ineffectual. The essay concludes by reviewing the law of maritime piracy and by offering some proposals for improving enforcement.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2014|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Forthcoming in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Jurgen Backhaus, ed.|
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- Bensassi, Sami & Martínez-Zarzoso, Inmaculada, 2010.
"How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy for the International Community?,"
27134, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Sami Bensassi & Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, 2012. "How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy to the International Community?," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 869-883, November.
- Sami Bensassi & Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, 2011. "How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy for the International Community?," Ibero America Institute for Econ. Research (IAI) Discussion Papers 208, Ibero-America Institute for Economic Research.
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- Keith N. Hylton, 1996. "Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 197-206, Spring.
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- Shavell, Steven, 1991. "Individual precautions to prevent theft: Private versus socially optimal behavior," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 123-132, September.
- Helen B Bendall, 2010. "Cost of piracy: A comparative voyage approach," Maritime Economics and Logistics, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 12(2), pages 178-195, June.
- Naranjo, Alberto J., 2010. "Spillover effects of domestic law enforcement policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 265-275, September.
- Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1049-1094, December.
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