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Private protection and public policing

Author

Listed:
  • Ross Hickey

    (UBC - University of British Columbia [Canada], RMIT University - Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology University)

  • Steeve Mongrain

    (SFU.ca - Simon Fraser University = Université Simon Fraser)

  • Joanne Roberts

    (Yale-NUS College)

  • Tanguy Ypersele

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper looks at situations in which public and private protection are complementary, that is, when private protection must be coordinated with public protection to be effective. For example, home alarms deter theft by being connected to a local police station: if the police do not respond to a home alarm, the home alarm on its own is virtually useless in halting a crime in action. We make a distinction between gross and net complementarity and substitution, where the latter takes into account the effect on the crime rate. We show that when public and private protection are complements, the optimal provision of public protection trades off the manipulation effect of encouraging private protection with the compensatory effect of providing protection to households that do not privately invest. We discuss the implications of our results for policy and empirical research in this area.

Suggested Citation

  • Ross Hickey & Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts & Tanguy Ypersele, 2021. "Private protection and public policing," Post-Print hal-03391506, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03391506
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12473
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Niloy Bose & Richard Cothren & Nazanin Sedaghatkish, 2024. "Endogenous property rights, credit market, and economic development," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(2), April.
    2. Petros G. Sekeris & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2020. "An Economic Analysis of Violent Crime," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 975-999.
    3. Friehe, Tim & Mungan, Murat C., 2022. "Private protection against crime and public policing: Political economy considerations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
    4. Konrad, Kai A., 2024. "The collective security dilemma of preemptive strikes," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 313(3), pages 1191-1199.
    5. Bruno Decreuse & Steeve Mongrain & Tanguy van Ypersele, 2022. "Property crime and private protection allocation within cities: Theory and evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(3), pages 1142-1163, July.
    6. Rim Lahmandi‐Ayed & Hejer Lasram & Didier Laussel, 2021. "Is partial privatization of universities a solution for higher education?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(6), pages 1174-1198, December.
    7. Rim Lahmandi-Ayed & Hejer Lasram & Didier Laussel, 2020. "Is partial privatization of universities a solution for higher education? A successive monopolies model," Working Papers hal-02988323, HAL.
    8. Francis Petterini & Akauã Flores, 2021. "Copula econometrics to simulate effects of private policing on crime," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 41(3), pages 1241-1254.
    9. Francis C. Petterini, 2024. "Modelling simultaneously censored outcomes of private policing and crime," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 66(3), pages 1311-1331, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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