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The Engine Immobiliser: A Non‐starter for Car Thieves

Author

Listed:
  • Jan C. Ours
  • Ben Vollaard

Abstract

We provide evidence for a beneficial welfare impact of a crime policy that is targeted at strengthening victim precaution. Regulation made application of the electronic engine immobilizer, a simple and low-cost anti-theft device, mandatory for all new cars sold within the European Union as of 1998. We exploit the regulation as source of exogenous variation in use of the device by year of manufacture of cars. Based on detailed data at the level of car models, we find that uniform application of the security device reduced the probability of car theft by an estimated 50 percent on average in the Netherlands during 1995-2008, accounting for both the protective effect on cars with the device and the displacement effect on cars without the device. The costs per prevented theft equal some 1,500 Euro; a fraction of the social benefits of a prevented car theft.
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Suggested Citation

  • Jan C. Ours & Ben Vollaard, 2016. "The Engine Immobiliser: A Non‐starter for Car Thieves," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(593), pages 1264-1291, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:126:y:2016:i:593:p:1264-1291
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecoj.2016.126.issue-593
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    Cited by:

    1. Timothy Besley & Hannes Mueller, 2018. "Predation, Protection, and Productivity: A Firm-Level Perspective," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 184-221, April.
    2. Anna Bindler & Randi Hjalmarsson & Nadine Ketel & Andreea Mitrut, 2024. "Discontinuities in the Age-Victimisation Profile and the Determinants of Victimisation," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(657), pages 95-134.
    3. Yu Aoki & Theodore Koutmeridis, 2019. "Shaking Criminal Incentives," Working Papers 2019-13, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    4. Galiani, Sebastian & Jaitman, Laura & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2020. "Crime and durable goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 146-163.
    5. Yu Aoki & Theodore Koutmeridis, 2019. "Shaking Criminal Incentives," Working Papers 2019_13, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    6. Farrell, Graham, 2020. "Why has burglary declined in the United States? Evidence relating to the security hypothesis," SocArXiv c78wz, Center for Open Science.
    7. Mirko Draca & Theodore Koutmeridis & Stephen Machin, 2019. "The Changing Returns to Crime: Do Criminals Respond to Prices?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(3), pages 1228-1257.
    8. Vikram Maheshri & Giovanni Mastrobuoni, 2018. "Do Security Measures Displace Crime? Theory and Evidence from Italian Bank Robberies," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 579, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    9. Hodgkinson, Tarah & Andresen, Martin A., 2019. "Changing spatial patterns of residential burglary and the crime drop: The need for spatial data signatures," Journal of Criminal Justice, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 90-100.
    10. Mueller,Hannes Felix & Techasunthornwat,Chanon, 2020. "Conflict and Poverty," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9455, The World Bank.
    11. Francesco Angelini & Massimiliano Castellani & Naomi Oosterman, 2025. "Before the hammer falls: an empirical analysis of the market reaction to art thefts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 77-100, February.
    12. Errol, Zeresh & Madsen, Jakob B. & Moslehi, Solmaz, 2021. "Social disorganization theory and crime in the advanced countries: Two centuries of evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 519-537.
    13. Natalia Vasilenok, 2018. "What Drives the Private Provision of Security: Evidence from Russian Regions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 197/EC/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    14. Gil, Ricard & Macis, Mario, 2015. ""Ain't No Rest for the Wicked": Population, Crime, and the 2013 Government Shutdown," IZA Discussion Papers 8864, IZA Network @ LISER.
    15. Ignacio Munyo & Martín A. Rossi, 2020. "Police‐Monitored Cameras and Crime," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(3), pages 1027-1044, July.
    16. Tom Kirchmaier & Stephen Machin & Matteo Sandi & Robert Witt, 2020. "Prices, Policing and Policy: The Dynamics of Crime Booms and Busts," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 1040-1077.
    17. Amodio, Francesco, 2019. "Crime protection investment spillovers: Theory and evidence from the City of Buenos Aires," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 626-649.
    18. Mirzaoglu, Gulbike, 2023. "Essays in economics of crime prevention and behavior under uncertainty," Other publications TiSEM 2365661f-9f4d-4511-ad2f-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. Lena Edlund & Cecilia Machado, 2019. "It's the Phone, Stupid: Mobiles and Murder," NBER Working Papers 25883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Briggs Depew & Isaac D. Swensen, 2019. "The Decision to Carry: The Effect of Crime on Concealed-Carry Applications," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 54(4), pages 1121-1153.
    21. O’Flaherty, Brendan & Sethi, Rajiv, 2015. "Urban Crime," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 1519-1621, Elsevier.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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