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Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking

  • Jenny Monheim-Helstroffer


    (CREA - Center for Research in Economic Analysis - Université du Luxembourg)

  • Marie Obidzinski


    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - Université de Franche-Comté : EA)

This paper develops a regulatory competition model to study whether and how refugee law should be centralized, and what are the consequences for refugees and for host countries. Varying refugee flows across countries lead some destinations to adopt strict measures. The resulting externality leads to a generalized “race to the bottom” of asylum law. Neither fixed nor minimum standard harmonization are found to be in the interest of both host countries. Especially the most popular destinations like EU border countries would suffer from losing discretion. However, minimum standards would benefit refugees and less popular destinations.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00447157.

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Date of creation: Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, International Review of Law and Economics, 2010, 30, 1, 86-97
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00447157
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