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On Legal Cooperation and the Dynamics of Legal Convergence

Author

Listed:
  • Bertrand Crettez

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Bruno Deffains

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Olivier Musy

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In this paper, we study the dynamics of legal convergence and the comparison between the different instruments of legal convergence based on cooperative strategies (i.e., harmonization and unification) or not. To study these questions we use a model with two nation-states which is inspired in part by that used in Carbonara and Parisi (2008) where preferences of each nation-state are such that it is costly to change the law, but it is also costly to have a different legal system from the other nation-state. We show that legal unification could be achieved in the long-run through small step by step changes despite the existence of huge harmonization costs in the short run. We also show that legal cooperation is not always necessary to achieve legal convergence.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand Crettez & Bruno Deffains & Olivier Musy, 2010. "On Legal Cooperation and the Dynamics of Legal Convergence," Working Papers hal-04140912, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04140912
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04140912
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baniak Andrzej & Grajzl Peter, 2011. "Interjurisdictional Linkages and the Scope for Interventionist Legal Harmonization," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 405-434, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Law-and-Economics; Legal Convergence; Legal harmonization; Legal Uniformization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)

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