Interjurisdictional Linkages and the Scope for Interventionist Legal Harmonization
We study the desirability of interventionist harmonization of legal standards across multiple, mutually interdependent jurisdictions which strive to adapt law to their local conditions, as well as to synchronize it with other jurisdictions. In a setting where jurisdictions are privately informed about their local conditions, we contrast the regime of decentralized standard-setting with two means of interventionist harmonization: through centralization and through allocation of lawmaking authority to a particular jurisdiction. Our analysis illuminates the importance of patterns of interjurisdictional linkages in delineating the scope for, and the appropriate means of, interventionist harmonization. We find that greater jurisdictional interdependence the hallmark of globalization does not per se justify interventionist harmonization, unless increased interdependence results in notable asymmetries in the pattern of jurisdictional interdependence. We also show that, in the presence of cross-jurisdictional externalities, harmonization is, contrary to conventional predictions, not desirable when local preferences are homogeneous across jurisdictions.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 7 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.degruyter.com|
|Order Information:||Web: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rle|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Federico Etro, 2003.
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
2001, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2001.
"What Does the European Union Do?,"
NBER Working Papers
8647, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2002. "What Does the European Union Do?," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 61, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
- Alesina, Alberto F & Angeloni, Ignazio & Schuknecht, Ludger, 2002. "What Does the European Union Do?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3115, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2001. "What Does the European Union Do?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1935, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Schuknecht, Ludger & Angeloni, Ignazio & Alesina, Alberto, 2005. "What Does The European Union Do?," Scholarly Articles 4553010, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alessandra Casella & Jonathan S. Feinstein, 2002. "Public Goods in Trade on the Formation of Markets and Jurisdictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(2), pages 437-462, May.
- Nuno Garoupa & Anthony Ogus, 2006.
"A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants,"
The Journal of Legal Studies,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 339-363, 06.
- Ulph, Alistair, 2000. "Harmonization and Optimal Environmental Policy in a Federal System with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 224-241, March.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
- Ben Lockwood, 2002.
"Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 313-337.
- Lockwood, Ben, 1998. "Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization," CEPR Discussion Papers 2046, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Crettez B. & Deffains B. & Musy O., 2010.
"On Legal Cooperation and the Dynamics of Legal Convergence,"
Working Papers ERMES
1013, ERMES, University Paris 2.
- Bertrand Crettez & Bruno Deffains & Olivier Musy, 2010. "On Legal Cooperation and the Dynamics of Legal Convergence," EconomiX Working Papers 2010-17, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
- Ricardo Alonso & Wouter Dessein & Niko Matouschek, 2008. "When does coordination require centralization?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58664, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Loeper, Antoine, 2011.
"Coordination in heterogeneous federal systems,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 900-912.
- Bertrand Crettez & Régis Deloche, 2006. "On the unification of legal rules in the European Union," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 203-214, May.
- Bård Harstad, 2007. "Harmonization and Side Payments in Political Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 871-889, June.
- Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, 2007. "The paradox of legal harmonization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 367-400, September.
- Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, 2009. "Choice of law and legal evolution: rethinking the market for legal rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 461-492, June.
- HERINGS, P. Jean-Jacques & KANNING, Arnald J., "undated".
"Harmonization of private law on a global level,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
2152, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Michael Hoel, 1992. "International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 141-159, March.
- Ribstein, Larry E & Kobayashi, Bruce H, 1996. "An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 131-199, January.
- Esty, Daniel C. & Geradin, Damien (ed.), 2001. "Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration: Comparative Perspectives," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198299059.
- Mukand, Sharun & Rodrik, Dani, 2002.
"In Search of the Holy Grail: Policy Convergence, Experimentation and Economic Performance,"
Working Paper Series
rwp02-027, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Sharun W. Mukand & Dani Rodrik, 2005. "In Search of the Holy Grail: Policy Convergence, Experimentation, and Economic Performance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 374-383, March.
- Mukand, Sharun W. & Rodrik, Dani, 2002. "In Search of the Holy Grail: Policy Convergence, Experimentation and Economic Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 3525, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Sharun Mukand & Dani Rodrik, 2002. "In Search of the Holy Grail: Policy Convergence, Experimentation, and Economic Performance," NBER Working Papers 9134, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jenny Monheim & Marie Obidzinski, 2007.
"Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking,"
Working Papers of BETA
2007-31, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Ricardo Alonso & Wouter Dessein & Niko Matouschek, 2008.
"When Does Coordination Require Centralization?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 145-179, March.
- Christoph Knill & Andrea Lenschow, 2005. "Compliance, Competition and Communication: Different Approaches of European Governance and their Impact on National Institutions," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 583-606, 09.
- Van den Bergh, Roger, 2000. "Towards an Institutional Legal Framework for Regulatory Competition in Europe," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 435-466.
- Carbonara Emanuela & Luppi Barbara & Parisi Francesco, 2009. "Self-Defeating Subsidiarity," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 741-783, December.
- Jerome Sgard, 2004. "Are There Such Things as International Property Rights?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 387-401, 03.
- Heikki Rantakari, 2008. "Governing Adaptation -super-1," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(4), pages 1257-1285.
- Dani Rodrik, 2000. "How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 177-186, Winter.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
- Juan JosÃ© Ganuza & Fernando GÃ³mez, 2008. "Realistic Standards: Optimal Negligence with Limited Liability," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(2), pages 577-594, 06.
- Bertrand Crettez & Bruno Deffains & Régis Deloche, 2009. "On the optimal complexity of law and legal rules harmonization," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 129-142, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:7:y:2011:i:2:n:4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.