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Asylum providers: Hawks or Doves?

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  • Yuji Tamura

Abstract

I examine the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of an asylum provision game in pure strategies, assuming that asylum is an international public good. An equilibrium does not necessarily exist because the players. payo¤s are not quasiconcave. When an equilibrium exists, it is either unique or multiple. When multiple equilibria arise, the game is a variant of hawk-dove game. Multiple equilibria suggest the counter-intuitive possibility that the more popular destination is more open to refugees even though openness is not modeled to boost popularity.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuji Tamura, 2017. "Asylum providers: Hawks or Doves?," CEPR Discussion Papers 699, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
  • Handle: RePEc:auu:dpaper:699
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    File URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/CEPR/DP699.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    asylum seekers; refugee protection; international public goods; chicken game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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