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The EU legislation game: the case of asylum law

Author

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  • Jenny Monheim-Helstroffer
  • Marie Obidzinski

Abstract

The newly introduced codecision procedure in asylum lawmaking at the EU level is analyzed through the lens of bargaining theory. We find a substantial institutional status quo bias, which can contribute to explain the current delays in asylum lawmaking. When a policy is agreed on, codecision increases the European Parliament’s influence, although the bargaining outcome is biased towards the Council of Ministers. It can nonetheless improve asylum seekers’ welfare. The Commission detains an agenda setting power.

Suggested Citation

  • Jenny Monheim-Helstroffer & Marie Obidzinski, 2011. "The EU legislation game: the case of asylum law," Working Papers of BETA 2011-16, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  • Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2011-16
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    File URL: http://www.beta-umr7522.fr/productions/publications/2011/2011-16.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thierry Burger-Helmchen & Laurence Frank, 2011. "La création de rentes : une approche par les compétences et capacités dynamiques," Innovations, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(2), pages 89-111.
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    3. Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 2006. "Preponderance of evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 963-976, May.
    4. Pierre Dehez & Daniela Tellone, 2013. "Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(4), pages 654-673, August.
    5. Monheim-Helstroffer, Jenny & Obidzinski, Marie, 2010. "Optimal discretion in asylum lawmaking," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 86-97, March.
    6. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 129-154, August.
    7. Pierre Dehez & Daniela Tellone, 2013. "Data Games: Sharing Public Goods with Exclusion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(4), pages 654-673, August.
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    9. repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:13:y:2011:i:02:n:s0219198911002915 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asylum policy; Public choice; Codecision; EU institutions; Human rights.;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs

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