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Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents

  • Hitoshi Matsushiima

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

We investigate the moral hazard problem in which the principal delegates multiple tasks to two agents. She imperfectly monitors the action choices by observing the public signals that are correlated through the macro shock and that satisfy conditional independence. When the number of tasks is sufficiently high, relative performance evaluation functions effectively for unique implementation, where the desirable action choices are supported by an approximate Nash equilibrium, and any approximate Nash equilibrium virtually induces the first-best allocation. Thus, this is an extremely effective method through which the principal divides the workers into two groups and makes them compete with each other.

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Paper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-419.

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Length: 28pages
Date of creation: Apr 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2006cf419
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  1. Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2010. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CARF F-Series CARF-F-209, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  2. Patrick Legros & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1991. "Efficiency in partnerships," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7044, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  3. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:10:y:2004:i:10:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Laurent Franckx & Isabelle Brose & Alessio DAmato, 2004. "Multitask Rank Order Tournaments," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(10), pages 1-10.
  5. repec:oup:restud:v:51:y:1984:i:3:p:433-46 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2001. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 158-178, May.
  8. repec:oup:restud:v:55:y:1988:i:4:p:555-72 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Multi-Group Incentives," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-201, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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