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Coordinating development: Can income-based incentive schemes eliminate Pareto inferior equilibria?

  • Bond, Philip
  • Pande, Rohini

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304-3878(06)00138-6
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 83 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
Pages: 368-391

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Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:83:y:2007:i:2:p:368-391
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec

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  1. Rai, Ashok S., 2002. "Targeting the poor using community information," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 71-83, October.
  2. Lanjouw, Jean O. & Lanjouw, Peter, 2001. "The rural non-farm sector: issues and evidence from developing countries," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 1-23, October.
  3. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1989. "Industrialization and the Big Push," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1003-26, October.
  4. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
  5. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 997-1021, July.
  6. Becker, Gary S & Murphy, Kevin M & Tamura, Robert, 1990. "Human Capital, Fertility, and Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages S12-37, October.
  7. Ching-To Ma, 1988. "Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 555-572.
  8. Cooper,Russell, 1999. "Coordination Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521578967, November.
  9. Krueger, Anne O, 1997. "Trade Policy and Economic Development: How We Learn," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 1-22, March.
  10. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
  11. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
  12. Arya, Anil & Glover, Jonathan & Hughes, John S., 1997. "Implementing Coordinated Team Play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 218-232, May.
  13. Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1992. "Efficient and Nearly Efficient Partnerships," Discussion Papers 991R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Dilip Mookherjee, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 433-446.
  15. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124.
  16. Bengt Holmstrom, 1981. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Discussion Papers 471, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  17. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1992. "Workfare versus Welfare Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 249-61, March.
  18. Piketty Thomas, 1993. "Implementation of First-Best Allocations via Generalized Tax Schedules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 23-41, October.
  19. Battaglini, Marco, 2006. "Joint production in teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 138-167, September.
  20. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-42, November.
  21. Rodrik, Dani, 1996. "Coordination failures and government policy: A model with applications to East Asia and Eastern Europe," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 1-22, February.
  22. Arya Anil & Glover Jonathan & Young Richard, 1995. "Virtual Implementation in Separable Bayesian Environments Using Simple Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 127-138, May.
  23. Cooper,Russell, 1999. "Coordination Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521570176, November.
  24. Peter J. Hammond, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 263-282.
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