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Implementing Coordinated Team Play

Author

Listed:
  • Anil Arya
  • Jonathan Glover
  • John S. Hughes

Abstract

This note studies a moral hazard model of joint production in which there are strong gains to coordination. The mechanism we propose for resolving the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting is simple. A key aspect of the mechanism is the use of at- will contracts which provide the agents with the option to quit at any time.

Suggested Citation

  • Anil Arya & Jonathan Glover & John S. Hughes, "undated". "Implementing Coordinated Team Play," Corporate Finance & Organizations _006, Ohio State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:wop:ohstfi:_006
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    File URL: http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/dept/acctmis/fac/arya/work/irjet.doc
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    2. Fumitoshi Moriya & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 173-186, January.
    3. Amoros, Pablo, 2004. "Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 424-434, November.
    4. Yuan, Yating, 2025. "Costless Coordination through Public Contracting," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1561, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    5. Bond, Philip & Pande, Rohini, 2007. "Coordinating development: Can income-based incentive schemes eliminate Pareto inferior equilibria?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 368-391, July.
    6. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2003. "Corrigendum to "Voluntary implementation": J. Econ. Theor. 98 (2001) 1-25," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 204-205, May.
    7. Schnedler, Wendelin, 2000. "Who gets the Reward? An Empirical Exploration of Bonus Pay and Task Characteristics," IZA Discussion Papers 235, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Bond, Philip & Pande, Rohini, 2005. "Coordinating Development: Can Income-based Incentive Schemes Eliminate Pareto Inferior Equilibria?," Center Discussion Papers 28436, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
    9. Sandro Brusco, 2002. "Unique Implementation of Action Profiles: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(2), pages 509-532, May.
    10. Pierre Fleckinger, 2007. "On Multiagent Moral Hazard under Technological Uncertainty," Working Papers hal-00240716, HAL.
    11. Dennis Courtney & Thomas Marschak, 2009. "Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 7-43, April.
    12. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.

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