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On Multiagent Moral Hazard under Technological Uncertainty

  • Pierre Fleckinger

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7657 - Polytechnique - X)

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    Ce papier réexamine la question de la forme optimale des incitations en termes de concurrence et coopération dans un contexte d'aléa moral avec plusieurs agents. Une analyse détaillée de la connaissance imparfaite sur la technologie permet d'obtenir de nouveaux résultats. En général, le schéma optimal est collectif quand la production est complémentaire, et compétitif quand les efforts sont substituts. En conséquence, l'idée très répandue que le principal doit utiliser un schéma d'autant plus concurrentiel que les performances sont corrélées à l'équilibre n'est pas valide quand les agents sont neutres au risque. En effet, des niveaux de corrélation croissant avec les efforts des agents créent une forme de complémentarité informationnelle, qui plaide pour des schémas collectifs. Quand les agents sont averses au risque, cet effet informationnel est à mettre en balance avec la demande d'assurance des agents. Le schéma optimal est alors soit concurrentiel, soit mixte, ce qui est une nouveauté dans la littérature. Les schémas mixtes peuvent être interprétés comme l'utilisation conjointe de plans de partage des gains et de clauses de licenciement ou de promotion

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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00240716.

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    Date of creation: 2007
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00240716
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