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Multitask Rank Order Tournaments

Author

Listed:
  • Laurent Franckx

    () (Royal Military Academy of Belgium)

  • Isabelle Brose

    () (Royal Military Academy of Belgium)

  • Alessio DAmato

    () (University of Rome)

Abstract

This work extends Lazear and Rosen's seminal paper to evaluate the performance of rank order tournaments when agents perform multiple tasks and the principal chooses, together with the prize spread, the weights assigned to each task in determining aggregate performance of each agent. All essential results of one-dimensional tournaments generalize to a multi-dimensional setting. However, the relative performance of tournaments and linear piece rates is shown to also depend on the covariance between measurement errors.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent Franckx & Isabelle Brose & Alessio DAmato, 2004. "Multitask Rank Order Tournaments," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(10), pages 1-10.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-04j30003
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2004/Volume10/EB-04J30003A.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2012. "Personnel Economics," Introductory Chapters,in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.), The Handbook of Organizational Economics Princeton University Press.
    3. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, March.
    4. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    5. Malcomson, James M, 1984. "Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(3), pages 486-507, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Franckx & Alessio D’Amato†, Isabelle Brose & Isabelle Brose, 2004. "Multi Pollutant Yardstick Schemes as Environmental Policy Tools," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0416, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    2. Derek J. Clark & Kai A. Konrad, 2007. "Contests with Multi-tasking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(2), pages 303-319, June.
    3. Liu, Lirong & Neilson, William, 2013. "Enforcement Leverage with Fixed Inspection Capacity," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 3(4), pages 305-328, August.
    4. Alessio D’Amato & Laurent Franckx, 2010. "Nonpoint pollution regulation targeted on emission proxies: the role of yardstick schemes," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 12(4), pages 201-218, December.
    5. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Role Of Relative And Absolute Performance Evaluations In Intergroup Competition," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 443-454, December.
    6. Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006. "Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-419, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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