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Governance in the Gullies: Democratic Responsiveness and Leadership in Delhi's Slums

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  • Jha, Saumitra
  • Rao, Vijayendra
  • Woolcock, Michael

Abstract

The authors use detailed ethnographic evidence to design and interpret a broad representative survey of 800 households in Delhi's slums, examining the processes by which residents gain access to formal government and develop their own informal modes of leadership. While ethnically homogeneous slums transplant rural institutions to the city, newer and ethnically diverse slums depend on informal leaders who gain their authority through political connections, education, and network entrepreneurship. Education and political affiliation are more important than seniority in determining a leader's influence. Informal leaders are accessible to all slum dwellers, but formal government figures are most accessed by the wealthy and the well-connected.
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Suggested Citation

  • Jha, Saumitra & Rao, Vijayendra & Woolcock, Michael, 2007. "Governance in the Gullies: Democratic Responsiveness and Leadership in Delhi's Slums," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 230-246, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:35:y:2007:i:2:p:230-246
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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