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An Indian Model of Aristocratic Patronage

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  • Platteau, Jean-Philippe

Abstract

Patron-client relations in traditional agrarian societies can be analyzed as informal vertically structured systems of insurance. This paper is more specifically concerned with situations, such as have been documented for some parts of India, in which patron-client ties are hereditary and nonexclusive. Special attention is devoted to the coordination problems that arise in such a framework of (noncompetitive and nondyadic) relations and to considerations of effective availability of the client workforce that bear upon these problems. Moreover, an effort is made to assess the impact of a number of recent changes in the environment of Indian rural societies. Copyright 1995 by Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 1995. "An Indian Model of Aristocratic Patronage," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 636-662, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:47:y:1995:i:4:p:636-62
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    Cited by:

    1. Margherita Comola & Marcel Fafchamps, 2014. "Testing Unilateral and Bilateral Link Formation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(579), pages 954-976, September.
    2. Soham Baksi & Pinaki Bose & Marc T. Law, 2021. "Coercion, Obnoxious Tasks, and Economic Efficiency," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 177(1), pages 120-134.
    3. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Sekeris, Petros G., 2010. "On the feasibility of power and status ranking in traditional setups," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 267-282, September.
    4. Sheahan, Megan & Liu, Yanyan & Barrett, Christopher B. & Narayanan, Sudha, 2014. "The political economy of MGNREGS spending in Andhra Pradesh:," IFPRI discussion papers 1371, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    5. Jha, Saumitra & Rao, Vijayendra & Woolcock, Michael, 2007. "Governance in the Gullies: Democratic Responsiveness and Leadership in Delhi's Slums," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 230-246, February.
    6. Joshua Blumenstock & Nathan Eagle & Marcel Fafchamps, 2011. "Risk and Reciprocity Over the Mobile Phone Network: Evidence from Rwanda," CSAE Working Paper Series 2011-19, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    7. Mahvish Shami, 2022. "Access to Justice in Clientelist Networks," The British Journal of Criminology, Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, vol. 62(2), pages 337-358.
    8. Catherine Bros, 2009. "Social Fragmentation and Public Goods Revisiting the Olson's Effect in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00424155, HAL.
    9. Azam Chaudhry & Kate Vyborny, 2013. "Patronage in Rural Punjab: Evidence from a New Household Survey Dataset," Lahore Journal of Economics, Department of Economics, The Lahore School of Economics, vol. 18(Special E), pages 183-209, September.
    10. Margherita Comola, 2010. "The network structure of mutual support links: Evidence from rural Tanzania," PSE Working Papers halshs-00585968, HAL.
    11. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Guirkinger, Catherine, 2019. "The dynamics of family systems: lessons from past and present times," CEPR Discussion Papers 13570, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Blumenstock, Joshua E. & Eagle, Nathan & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2016. "Airtime transfers and mobile communications: Evidence in the aftermath of natural disasters," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 157-181.
    13. Petros Sekeris, 2011. "Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 237-258, September.
    14. Catherine Bros, 2010. "Social fragmentation and public goods : polarization, inequality and patronage in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar," Post-Print halshs-00476016, HAL.
    15. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Seki, Erika, 2007. "Heterogeneity, social esteem and feasibility of collective action," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 302-325, July.
    16. Marcel Fafchamps, 2002. "Inequality and Risk," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2002-07, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    17. Srinivas, Smita, 2010. "Industrial welfare and the state: nation and city reconsidered," MPRA Paper 52651, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. repec:foi:wpaper:2010_14 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Marcel Fafchamps & Flore Gubert, 2007. "Contingent Loan Repayment in the Philippines," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(4), pages 633-667, July.

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