IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/rensus/v42y2015icp226-233.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Competitive auction mechanisms for the promotion renewable energy technologies: The case of the 50MW photovoltaics projects in Cyprus

Author

Listed:
  • Kylili, Angeliki
  • Fokaides, Paris A.

Abstract

There are a range of policy frameworks and support mechanisms to promote the penetration of renewable energy technologies into the energy mix assembled by the governments and regulatory bodies around the world. The three dominant and most common support schemes that have also been implemented within the EU and proven successful in the past include the competitive auctions, the Feed-in Tariff scheme (FiT), and Tradable Green Certificates (TGCs). This study reviews the use of the competitive auction mechanism for the promotion of power generation from renewable energy technologies. The process of the specific policy instrument as well as its pros and cons are introduced. Successful and failed case studies from countries that have already incorporated this mechanism into their renewable energy technologies development policies are also presented. Among these cases is the Cyprus auction procurement for the licensing of 50MW of photovoltaic power plants, conducted in January 2013, which is thoroughly elaborated in this paper. The timeline of the bids is presented, and the auction winner strategy is tracked and examined. A discussion is also presented on the feasibility of the awarded projects. Eventually, the entire auction procurement procedure is evaluated to expose the defects of the mechanism and to offer some recommendations for the viability of the process.

Suggested Citation

  • Kylili, Angeliki & Fokaides, Paris A., 2015. "Competitive auction mechanisms for the promotion renewable energy technologies: The case of the 50MW photovoltaics projects in Cyprus," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 226-233.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:rensus:v:42:y:2015:i:c:p:226-233
    DOI: 10.1016/j.rser.2014.10.022
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032114008399
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.rser.2014.10.022?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Currier, Kevin M., 2013. "A regulatory adjustment process for the determination of the optimal percentage requirement in an electricity market with Tradable Green Certificates," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 1053-1057.
    2. Wand, Robert & Leuthold, Florian, 2011. "Feed-in tariffs for photovoltaics: Learning by doing in Germany?," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 4387-4399.
    3. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
    4. Becker, Bastian & Fischer, Doris, 2013. "Promoting renewable electricity generation in emerging economies," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 446-455.
    5. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Survey of Auction Theory, from Auctions: Theory and Practice," Introductory Chapters, in: Auctions: Theory and Practice, Princeton University Press.
    6. Lesser, Jonathan A. & Su, Xuejuan, 2008. "Design of an economically efficient feed-in tariff structure for renewable energy development," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 981-990, March.
    7. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Moncada, J.A. & Junginger, M. & Lukszo, Z. & Faaij, A. & Weijnen, M., 2017. "Exploring path dependence, policy interactions, and actor behavior in the German biodiesel supply chain," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 195(C), pages 370-381.
    2. Shrimali, Gireesh & Konda, Charith & Farooquee, Arsalan Ali, 2016. "Designing renewable energy auctions for India: Managing risks to maximize deployment and cost-effectiveness," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 656-670.
    3. Yong Long & Yu Wang & Chengrong Pan, 2017. "Auction Mechanism of Micro-Grid Project Transfer," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(10), pages 1-20, October.
    4. Farrell, Niall & Devine, Mel, 2015. "How do External Costs affect Pay-as-bid Renewable Energy Connection Auctions?," Papers WP517, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    5. Faraji, Faramarz & Mousavi G., S.M. & Hajirayat, Aliasghar & Birjandi, Ali Akbar Moti & Al-Haddad, Kamal, 2017. "Single-stage single-phase three-level neutral-point-clamped transformerless grid-connected photovoltaic inverters: Topology review," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 197-214.
    6. Briguglio, Marie & Formosa, Glenn, 2017. "When households go solar: Determinants of uptake of a Photovoltaic Scheme and policy insights," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 154-162.
    7. Sirin, Selahattin Murat & Sevindik, Irem, 2021. "An analysis of Turkey's solar PV auction scheme: What can Turkey learn from Brazil and South Africa?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 148(PA).
    8. del Río, Pablo & Kiefer, Christoph P., 2023. "Academic research on renewable electricity auctions: Taking stock and looking forward," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
    9. Enikő Kácsor, 2021. "Modelling Bidding Behaviour on German Photovoltaic Auctions," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-32, January.
    10. Kruger, Wikus & Nygaard, Ivan & Kitzing, Lena, 2021. "Counteracting market concentration in renewable energy auctions: Lessons learned from South Africa," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 148(PB).
    11. Melliger, Marc, 2023. "Quantifying technology skewness in European multi-technology auctions and the effect of design elements and other driving factors," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).
    12. Ndiritu, S. Wagura & Engola, Monica Katungi, 2020. "The effectiveness of feed-in-tariff policy in promoting power generation from renewable energy in Kenya," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 593-605.
    13. Christoforou, Elias & Kylili, Angeliki & Fokaides, Paris A., 2016. "Technical and economical evaluation of olive mills solid waste pellets," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 96(PA), pages 33-41.
    14. Rasa Apanaviciene & Andrius Vanagas & Paris A. Fokaides, 2020. "Smart Building Integration into a Smart City (SBISC): Development of a New Evaluation Framework," Energies, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-19, May.
    15. Taliotis, Constantinos & Rogner, Holger & Ressl, Stephan & Howells, Mark & Gardumi, Francesco, 2017. "Natural gas in Cyprus: The need for consolidated planning," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 197-209.
    16. Wikus Kruger & Anton Eberhard, 2018. "Renewable energy auctions in sub‐Saharan Africa: Comparing the South African, Ugandan, and Zambian Programs," Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Energy and Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(4), July.
    17. Demetriou, E. & Mallouppas, G. & Hadjistassou, C., 2021. "Embracing carbon neutral electricity and transportation sectors in Cyprus," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    18. Kitzing, Lena & Siddique, Muhammad Bilal & Nygaard, Ivan & Kruger, Wikus, 2022. "Worth the wait: How South Africa's renewable energy auctions perform compared to Europe's leading countries," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    19. Izabela Godyń & Anna Dubel, 2021. "Evolution of Hydropower Support Schemes in Poland and Their Assessment Using the LCOE Method," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(24), pages 1-23, December.
    20. Münch, Florian Anselm & Marian, Adela, 2022. "The design of technical requirements in public solar auctions: Evidence from India," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    21. Farrell, Niall & Devine, Mel T. & Soroudi, Alireza, 2018. "An auction framework to integrate dynamic transmission expansion planning and pay-as-bid wind connection auctions," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 228(C), pages 2462-2477.
    22. Paulo Henrique de Mello Santana, 2015. "Cost-effectiveness as Energy Policy Mechanisms: The Paradox of Technology-neutral and Technology-specific Policies in the Short and Long Term," Working Papers Working Paper 2015-02, Regional Research Institute, West Virginia University.
    23. Paris A. Fokaides & Rasa Apanaviciene & Jurgita Černeckiene & Andrius Jurelionis & Egle Klumbyte & Vilma Kriauciunaite-Neklejonoviene & Darius Pupeikis & Donatas Rekus & Jolanta Sadauskiene & Lina Sed, 2020. "Research Challenges and Advancements in the field of Sustainable Energy Technologies in the Built Environment," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(20), pages 1-20, October.
    24. de Mello Santana, Paulo Henrique, 2016. "Cost-effectiveness as energy policy mechanisms: The paradox of technology-neutral and technology-specific policies in the short and long term," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 1216-1222.
    25. Pyrgou, Andri & Kylili, Angeliki & Fokaides, Paris A., 2016. "The future of the Feed-in Tariff (FiT) scheme in Europe: The case of photovoltaics," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 94-102.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chatterjee, Rittwik & Chattopadhyay, Srobonti, 2015. "Competition and Auctioning Licenses," MPRA Paper 67086, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
    3. Drabik Ewa, 2013. "Several Remarks on Banach–Mazur Games and its Applications Ewa Drabik," Foundations of Management, Sciendo, vol. 5(1), pages 1-5, June.
    4. B Kelsey Jack, 2009. "Auctioning Conservation Contracts in Indonesia - Participant Learning in Multiple Trial Rounds," CID Working Papers 35, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    5. Alessandra Casella & Adam B. Cox, 2018. "A Property Rights Approach to Temporary Work Visas," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(S1), pages 195-227.
    6. Soumyakanti Chakraborty & Anup K. Sen & Amitava Bagchi, 2015. "Addressing the valuation problem in multi-round combinatorial auctions," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 1145-1160, October.
    7. Popkowski Leszczyc, Peter T.L. & Qiu, Chun & He, Yongfu, 2009. "Empirical Testing of the Reference-Price Effect of Buy-Now Prices in Internet Auctions," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 211-221.
    8. A. Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2015. "An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 769-784, August.
    9. Yu Zhou & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2019. "Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market," ISER Discussion Paper 1047, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    10. Comerford, Emma & Binney, Jim, 2006. "Lessons learned from the Queensland Vegetation Incentives Program - applying auction theory to vegetation protection," 2006 Conference (50th), February 8-10, 2006, Sydney, Australia 174101, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    11. Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2014. "An experimental study of bidding in contests of incomplete information," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 245-261, June.
    12. van der Laan, G. & Talman, Dolf & Yang, Z., 2018. "Equilibrium in the Assignment Market under Budget Constraints," Discussion Paper 2018-046, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    13. Jonathan Levin & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2016. "Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(9), pages 2528-2551, September.
    14. Brânzei, R. & Fragnelli, V. & Meca, A. & Tijs, S.H., 2006. "Two Classes of Cooperative Games Related to One-Object Auction Situations," Discussion Paper 2006-25, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    15. Wilson William W. & Dahl Bruce L., 2005. "Railcar Auctions for Grain Shipments: A Strategic Analysis," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 1-29, April.
    16. Ganuza, Juan José & Viecens, María Fernanda, 2011. "Deployment of high-speed broadband infrastructures during the economic crisis. The case of Xarxa Oberta," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(9), pages 857-870.
    17. Sven-Olof Fridolfsson and Thomas P. Tangeras, 2015. "Nuclear Capacity Auctions," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    18. Ralph-Christopher Bayer, 2016. "A Primer on Auction Design, Management, and Strategy , by David J. Salant ( MIT Press , Cambridge, London , 2014 ), pp. 184 ," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 92(298), pages 507-508, September.
    19. Eric Budish & Judd B. Kessler, 2022. "Can Market Participants Report Their Preferences Accurately (Enough)?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1107-1130, February.
    20. Peter Helgesson & Bernt Wennberg, 2015. "The N-Player War of Attrition in the Limit of Infinitely Many Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 65-93, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:rensus:v:42:y:2015:i:c:p:226-233. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/600126/description#description .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.