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Corporate governance and employee power in the boardroom: An applied game theoretic analysis

Listed author(s):
  • Balsmeier, Benjamin
  • Bermig, Andreas
  • Dilger, Alexander

The debate on employee representation on corporate boards has received considerable attention from scholars and politicians around the world. We provide new insights to this ongoing discussion by applying power indices from game theory to examine the actual voting power of employees on boards and its effect on firm performance. Based on unique panel data on the largest listed companies in Germany, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship between labor power and Tobin's Q. Moderate employee participation in corporate board decision-making can enhance firm value.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268113000991
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 91 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 51-74

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:91:y:2013:i:c:p:51-74
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.004
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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