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Board Structures Around the World: an Experimental Investigation

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  • Ann B. Gillette
  • Thomas H. Noe
  • Michael J. Rebello

Abstract

We model and experimentally examine the board structure-performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards. We find that even insider-controlled boards frequently adopt institutionally preferred rather than self-interested policies. Two-tiered boards adopt institutionally preferred policies more frequently but tend to destroy value by being too conservative, frequently rejecting good projects. Outsider-controlled single-tiered boards, both when they have multiple insiders and only a single insider, adopt institutionally preferred policies most frequently. In those board designs where the efficient Nash equilibrium produces strictly higher payoffs to all agents than the coalition-proof equilibria, agents tend to select the efficient Nash equilibria. Copyright 2008, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Ann B. Gillette & Thomas H. Noe & Michael J. Rebello, 2008. "Board Structures Around the World: an Experimental Investigation," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(1), pages 93-140.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:12:y:2008:i:1:p:93-140
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rof/rfm027
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    Cited by:

    1. Yoo, Taeyoung & Sung, Taeyoon, 2015. "How outside directors facilitate corporate R&D investment? Evidence from large Korean firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(6), pages 1251-1260.
    2. Naz Sayari & Bill Marcum, 2022. "Board systems, employee representation, and neo‐institutional theory: The moderating effect of economic freedom on corporate boards and financial performance," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3931-3952, December.
    3. Mavrakana, Christina & Psillaki, Maria, 2019. "Do board structure and compensation matter for bank stability and bank performance? Evidence from European banks," MPRA Paper 95776, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Berger, Allen N. & Kick, Thomas & Schaeck, Klaus, 2014. "Executive board composition and bank risk taking," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 48-65.
    5. Balsmeier, Benjamin & Bermig, Andreas & Dilger, Alexander, 2013. "Corporate governance and employee power in the boardroom: An applied game theoretic analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 51-74.
    6. Fan, Yaoyao & Jiang, Yuxiang & Kao, Mao-Feng & Liu, Frank Hong, 2020. "Board independence and firm value: A quasi-natural experiment using Taiwanese data," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 71-88.
    7. Xile Yin & Siyu Chen & Dahui Li & Feng Zhang, 2021. "Social norms for fairness and board voting behavior: An experimental investigation," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 110-133, March.
    8. Ginglinger, Edith & Megginson, William & Waxin, Timothée, 2011. "Employee ownership, board representation, and corporate financial policies," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 868-887, September.
    9. Bodeutsch, D.S. & Franses, Ph.H.B.F., 2015. "Risk attitudes in company boardrooms in a developing country," Econometric Institute Research Papers EI 2015-04, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.
    10. Wagner, Alexander F., 2011. "Board independence and competence," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 71-93, January.
    11. Esther B. Brio & Rosa M. Hernández-Maestro & Toru Yoshikawa, 2018. "How does interpersonal justice affect outside directors’ governance behavior? A cross-cultural comparison," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 683-709, July.
    12. Kamil K. Nazliben & Luc Renneboog & Emil Uduwalage, 2024. "Corporate governance from colonial Ceylon to post-civil war Sri Lanka," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 28(1), pages 265-335, March.
    13. Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini & Emiliano Sironi, 2017. "Does a one-tier board affect firms’ performances? Evidences from Italian unlisted enterprises," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 213-224, January.
    14. Jacob LaRiviere & Matthew McMahon & William Neilson, 2018. "Shareholder Protection and Agency Costs: An Experimental Analysis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(7), pages 3108-3128, July.
    15. Audretsch, David B. & Hülsbeck, Marcel & Lehmann, Erik E., 2013. "Families as active monitors of firm performance," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 118-130.
    16. Wagner, Alexander F. & Gibson Brandon, Rajna & Sohn, Matthias & Tanner, Carmen, 2018. "Earnings Management and Managerial Honesty: The Investors’ Perspectives," CEPR Discussion Papers 13207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. repec:dau:papers:123456789/3864 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Gillet, Joris & Schram, Arthur & Sonnemans, Joep, 2011. "Cartel formation and pricing: The effect of managerial decision-making rules," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 126-133, January.
    19. Adams, Renée B. & Ragunathan, Vanitha & Tumarkin, Robert, 2021. "Death by committee? An analysis of corporate board (sub-) committees," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(3), pages 1119-1146.
    20. Costa, King & Ngcetane-Vika, Thelela, 2021. "A comparative analysis of strengths and weaknesses of corporate governance practices between two jurisdictions; UK and South Africa," AfricArxiv k4cj3, Center for Open Science.

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